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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
AN AFTER TAX ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF HOME
EQUITY CONVERSION FOR THE ELDERLY

by

Lowell James Cramer
Florida International University, 1994
Miami, Florida
Professor Lewis F. Davidson, Major Professor

The FHA program to insure reverse mortgages has brought
additional attention to the use of home equity conversion to
increase income to the elderly*

Using simulation, this study

compares the economic consequences of the FHA reverse mortgage
with two alternative conversion vehicles:
interest and sale-leaseback.

sale of a remainder

An FHA insured plan is devised

for each vehicle, structured to represent fair substitutes for
the FHA mortgage*

In addition, the FHA mortgage is adjusted

to allow for a 4 percent annual increase in distributions to
the homeowner*

The viability of each plan for the homeowner,

the financial institution and the FHA is investigated using

different assumptions for house appreciation, tax rates, and
homeowners1 initial ages.

For the homeowner, the return of

each vehicle is compared with the choice of not employing home
equity conversion.

The study examines the impact of tax and

accounting rules on the selection of alternatives.

The study

investigates the sensitivity of the FHA model to some of its
assumptions.
Although none of the vehicles is Pareato optimal, the
study shows that neither the sale of a remainder interest nor
the sale-leaseback is a viable alternative vehicle to the
homeowner.

While each of these vehicles is profitable to the

financial institution,

the profits are not high enough to

transfer benefits to the homeowner and still be workable.

The

effects of tax rate, house appreciation rate, and homeowner's
initial age are surprisingly small.

As a general rule, none

of these factors materially impact the decision of either the
homeowner or the financial institution.

Tax and accounting

rules were found to have minimal impact on the selection of
vehicles.

The sensitivity analysis indicates that none of the

variables studied alone is likely to materially affect the
FHA1s profitability.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
The

growth

of the

elderly population

in the United

States1 has focused attention on the financial plight of the
aged.

During this era of large budget deficits, home equity

conversion,
funds

the use of a person's home equity to increase

available

for

retirement2 , allows

the

elderly

to

consume annually from the value of their real estate without
government outlay.

Although home equity conversions ("HEC"s)

date from the 1970's (Archer and Nye 1987, 1), they had not
gained widespread attention until the Department of Housing
and

Urban

Development

Housing Administration

("HUD")

started

providing

Federal

("FHA")3 insurance for home equity

conversion mortgages ("HECM,!s) 4 . In 1987 Congress authorized

In 1930, the elderly (those over age 65) represented 5.4
percent of the U.S. population.
In 1980, the percentage
increased to 11.3 percent. In 2030, the elderly are expected
to constitute 21.8 percent of the population. (U.S. Senate
Subcommittee on Aging et al. 1991, 7).
2This is a narrow definition.
Under a broader
definition, home equity conversion would also include standard
home equity mortgages used as lines of credit by working
individuals.
3Throughout
interchangeably *

this

paper

HUD

and

FHA

will

4HECMs are commonly called reverse mortgages.
will use the two terms interchangeably.
1

be

used

This paper

a demonstration project in which HUD could insure 2,500 HECMs
through September 30, 1991 (HUD 1990, 1-3).

This program was

later increased to allow 25 thousand HECMs through September
30, 1995 (Roma 1991).
The objective of this study is to evaluate the need for
the FHA to insure additional forms of home equity conversion,
namely a growth mortgage, split interest plan, and a saleleaseback.

These vehicles are discussed in chapter 2. There

are five major issues relating to the objective:
•

The
expected
homeowner;

economic

consequences

to

the

•

The expected economic consequences to the financial
institution;

•

The expected economic consequence to the FHA;

•

Suggested legislative changes by the government?
and

•

Accounting problems relating to these proposals.

The study compares the costs and benefits of these additional
vehicles to the FHA HECM mortgage.

In general,

the net

present value of expected cash flow is used to measure the
results, but other measures are used.

To date there has been

no study comparing the costs and benefits of these alternative
HEC vehicles.
Interest in home equity conversion is extremely strong.
For example, FHA received 28 thousand inquiries on the HECM
project in the interval before the start of the program (HUD
1990, p. 1-5) .

Actual demand has been less than expressed
2

interest.

Prior to the FHA program, only about 2,500 HECMs

had been written, one thousand by a single private issuer and
the reminder by government or nonprofit organizations

(HUD

1990, p. 3-1) . In the first nine months of operation, lenders
took only 572 FHA HECM mortgage applications and only 257
loans were closed.

This led one critic (Sichelman 1991) to

note that at that rate, the 25 thousand

mortgage limit would

not be exceeded for fifty years.
While the HECM mortgage is designed to give the homeowner
a monthly payment, not generally indexed for inflation, the
split interest ("SI") and the sale-leaseback (11SL") can result
in lower monthly payments, but provide inflation protection.
HECMs,

SLs,

and Sis are described

in chapter 2.

It

is

possible that the elderly homeowner may be as interested in
inflation protection as current cash receipts.

A comparison

of the three models shows the advantages and disadvantages to
the homeowner,

the

financial

institution

and the

insurer

(FHA).
This research uses Monte Carlo simulation to compare the
FHA HECM mortgage with similarly constructed and insured split
SI and SL arrangements and a growth HECM mortgage.

Simulation

is used because there are a large number of variables, some of
which act differently in different situations*

The FHA does

not presently insure the SI, SL, or growth HECM mortgages.
The research examines the economic effects on the homeowner,

3

the financial institution and the FHA on before- and after-tax
bases assuming different ages and property appreciation rates.
It

examines

the

accounting

flows

of

the

different

alternatives, to learn whether current and future cash flows
are reflected.

In addition, the financial viability of the

FHA model and the sensitivity of the model to several of its
assumptions are explored.
The outcome of this research should provide homeowners
and financial institutions information to better compare the
four forms of HEC being examined.

A second purpose is to

examine certain policy aspects of the plans.

Additionally,

information is provided to the insurer regarding the economic
viability of the plans.

The reason for testing the FHA plan

is to learn whether the plan is likely to break even.
This

research

organizations

and

should

be

governmental

of

interest

agencies

to

those

interested

promoting home equity conversion for the elderly.

in

It will

provide information to assess the usefulness of expanding the
FHA HEC (or the establishment of private programs) to include
one or more of the three model plans.

Moreover, this research

should be useful to the FHA for determining whether it can
carry out any of the three alternative plans without loss of
revenue

or

without

adverse

selection

risk*5

Private

5For example, if plan A is more favorable than plan B to
the FHA given low appreciation rates, but plan B is more
favorable given high appreciation rates, homeowners and
4

companies should find this research useful in deciding whether
to offer their own HEC plan or to insure the HEC plans of
others.
Accounting rules may have economic consequences that
discourage financial institutions from offering the plans. To
maintain

regulatory

capital

and

earnings,

financial

institutions, such as banks, will often be suffer reduced cash
flows

to

increase

Wolfson 1989).

reported

profits

(Scholes,

Wilson

and

If either the split interest or sale-leaseback

plan is adopted, accounting rules may have to be modified to
allow for the insured nature of the plans.

This is a concern

to special interest groups interested in promoting home equity
conversion*

For example the SEC's decision to change the

accounting for non-insured HECMs in 1992 was questioned by the
American Association of Retired Persons ("AARP”).
This research is of interest

from a tax perspective

because
it examines the effect of taxes on HEC choices of
the homeowner and the financial institution;
•

it examines for policy makers the need to change
the tax law and regulations to encourage new forms
of HEC? and

•

it aids homeowners and financial institutions in
evaluating the HEC choices on an after-tax basis*

institutions may be encouraged to use plan B if the property
is unlikely to appreciate and use plan A if the property is
likely to appreciate.
5

This research does not examine the legal requirements for
each type of HEC under state or federal laws.

It assumes that

each type of procedure is legal or can be made legal by
appropriate legislation or ruling.
that

banks

insurance
annuities.

and

other

companies)

financial
are

not

For example, it is likely
institutions

presently

(other

allowed

to

than
issue

This research assumes that a program to increase

HECs would include authorization for financial institutions to
issue annuities with a qualified HEC.
The remainder of this paper is divided into the following
chapters:
Background and perspective;
Methodology?
Results; and
Conclusion.
The conclusion includes

(1)

a summary,

(2) public policy

recommendations, and (3) research limitations, including areas
for further research.

6

CHAPTER II
BACKGROUND AND PERSPECTIVE
Home equity conversion is broadly defined as the use of
home equity (i.e., the value of the home) to provide cash to
the homeowner.
broad definition.

A traditional home equity loan meets this
However, it is defined more narrowly in

this research to include only those home equity conversion
vehicles ("HEC's) that are designed to provide additional cash
flows for elderly homeowners, to enable them to continue to
live in their present (or desired future home) without fear of
being forced out.

The three principal forms of HEC are the

home equity conversion mortgage6 ("HECM"), the split interest
("SI"), and the sale-leaseback ("SL").
are explained in this chapter.

Each of these forms

The primary purpose of this

research is to explore certain public policy implications of
encouraging
Specifically

additional
examined

HEC
are

vehicles
the

for

economic

the

elderly.

consequences

of

extending the FHA Home Equity Conversion Mortgage program to
allow for the following additional vehicles:
HECM,

(2) an SI, and (3) a SL.

(1) a growth

Although other forms of HEC

6The "home equity conversion mortgage" is often referred
to as a "reverse mortgage."
The two terms will be used
interchangeably in this study.
7

are available to certain segments of the elderly or poor in
some states, they are not part of this study due to their
limited availability.

Several states have also established

HEC mechanisms for the poor or elderly that permit either
deferral of property tax or maintenance costs (Scholen 1992,
155-79).

These are also not a part of this study.

This research is limited to HEC mechanisms that could be
made available through financial institutions.

Not considered

are such items as intra-family HEC vehicles or changes in life
style, e.g., renting a room or house sharing.*7
A rational decision model for pursuing any issue relating
to

a

particular

examination
policy,

national

of the

reasons

policy

would

for the

require

existing

(1)

an

or proposed

(2) possible solutions to the issues raised by the

policy, and (3) results of past alternatives implemented or
tried.

The purpose

of this

chapter

is to provide

such

background on the issue of home equity conversion for the
elderly consistent with this framework.
The chapter begins with a discussion of the economic
theory of the lifetime consumption function,

followed by a

7Pastalan
(1983)
observed that alternative living
arrangements, such as leasing a room and building an accessory
apartment would produce a larger increase in the homeowner's
disposable income than a typical reverse mortgage. Pastalan
fails to note that in many cases alternative living
arrangements can be combined with a reverse mortgage (or other
form of HEC) to further increase disposable income.
8

discussion of the need for home equity conversion.

Next, some

special policy issues of home equity conversion are mentioned.
The next three sections discuss the three major home
equity conversion vehicles being examined in this research:
(1)

the

home

equity

conversion

mortgage,

interest, and (3) the sale-leaseback.

(2)

the

split

Each section describes

(Table 1 summarizes the significant attributes of the three
plans);
•

the vehicle,

•

examples of programs using the vehicle, and
policy issues, such as accounting, taxation,
other issues of special interest.

9

and

TABLE 1
ATTRIBUTES OF HEC VEHICLES
_

-

. _

_

,

.

ATTRIBUTE

MORTGAGE

SPLIT I N T E R E S T

SALE-LEASEBACK

H OME
GROWTH
RATE

T h e F H A a b s orbs x~i$k that
a p p r e c i a t i o n will be at least
4 percent, any e xcess
b e n e f i t s the h o m e o w n e r .
T h e r e is an i n t e raction w ith
life e x p e c t a n c y -

The FHA absorbs risk that
ap preciation will be at. least 4
percent, .-any e xcess bene f i t s the
financial in.vt.i tut i o n , The r e is
an i nteraction w ith life
expectancy.

T h e F H A absorbs risk that
a p p r e c i a t i o n w i l l be at least 4
percent, any e x cess b e n e f i t s the
f i n a n e i a 1 institution.
The r e is
no inte r a c t i o n w i t h life
expectancy.

INFLATION
RISK

Ho m e o w n e r bears the full risk
of inflation.
A growth
m o r t g a g e would p r o v i d e
in f 1 at ion protect.ion.

That portion of the inflation
r i &k represe-n ting h o u sehoid
o p e r ating costs are pa s s e d to
the financial i n s t i t u t i o n .

T h a t p o r t i o n of the inf l a t i o n
risk repr e s e n t i n g h o u s e h o l d
o p e r a t i n g costs? are p a s s e d to
the financial institution.

UN E X P E C T E D
COSTS

Ko!r>ec%mer bears the r isk of
u n e x p e c t e d coets.
This could
c a u s e foreclosure.

Th e financial i n s t itution bears
the risk of un e x p e c t e d costs.

The- financial inst i t u t i o n bears
the r isk of u n e x p e c t e d costs.

T h e financial i n s t itution
bea r s the i nterest r ate risk,
h v a r i a b l e interest rate
o p t i o n allows the r i s k to be
p a s s e d to the hom e o w n e r and
the FHA-

Th e financial institution bears
the interest rate risk.

The fInancial i n s t itution bears
the i n terest rate risk.

INTE R E S T
RATE RISK

H o m e o w n e r "» a n n uity payments
(are not taxed.
On stove out
g ain i& t a x a b l e s u b j e c t to
$125,000 exclusion.
On moveout o r d e a t h inte r e s t is tax
deductible.

Initial s ale of r e m a inder
i n terest is subject to tax w ith
no $125,000 e?iciuaion allowed, h
p o r tion o.t the annuity p ayments
are taxable.

Initial sale of res i d e n c e is
su b ject to ta x w i t h §125,000
e x c l u s i o n allowed.
A p o r t i o n of
the annait.y paym e n t s are
taxable.

The f i n anc i a .1 ins titui ion ma y
d educt its portion o£ the house
o p e r a t i n g expenses as w ell as
its net annuity costs.
Encoxne
is recog n i s e d
w h e n the
remainder inte r e s t is sold and
w hen th e a n n uitant dies (from
ex p i r a t i o n of annuity).

The f i n ancial i n s t itution
r e c e i v e s rental .income and
d e d ucts h o m e o p e r a t i n g costs
p lus d epreciation.
T h e net
a n n u i t y cos t s are deductible.
D is c h a r g e of ind e b t e d n e s s income
is r e c o g n i z e d w h e n the a n n u i t a n t
dies.
The depreciation
d e d u c t i o n prov i d e s some tax
shelter,

INCOME TAX
TREATMENT

T h e f i n a ncial institution
nru s fc r ec o g n i z e sc c r u ed
income, e ven th o u g h not.
reccived.

Th e IRS has st a t e d t hat it may
t re a t a stale-leaseback, as a
s p 1 i f in t e r e a t c

ACCOUNTING
TREATMENT

LI Q U I D I T Y

A c c o u n t i n g is the same as
tax.
In c o m e is repo r t e d
despite negative cash f l o w s ,

A c c o u n t i n g is the same as tax.
Cos t s are reported every year
(an n uity and hou s e operating
costs), but income is o nly
r e p o r t e d w h e n the hou s e is sold
and when the annuitant, dies.

Ac c o u n t i n g is the same as tax
e x c e p t t hat d e p r e c i a t i o n uses a
longer life.
I n come d oes not
r e f l e c t g u a r a n t e e d m i n i m u m sales
price.

C u r r e n t l y F N M A p u r c h a s e s all
mortg a g e s .
T h e terms of the
F H A m o r t g a g e m a k e s it
d i f f i c u l t to aecuritise.-

Some liq u i d i t y
wou l d be
p r o v i d e d by tra n s f e r r i n g the
a n n uity to an i n s urance c o m pany
and selling the remainder
interest to investors.

S ome li q u i d i t y w o u l d b e p r o v i d e d
by t r a n s f e r r i n g t h e annu i t y to
an i n s u r a n c e c o m p a n y and sell i n g
the p r o p e r t y to investors.

N o SSI p roblems

A p o r tion of the annuity wou l d
prob a b l y be c o n s i d e r e d u n earned
income for p u rposes of SSI.

A p o r t i o n of the a n n u i t y wou l d
p r o b a b l y foe c o n s i d e r e d u n e a r n e d
.income for purp o s e s of SSI.

Th e r i s k of living b eyond
life e x p e c t a n c y is pa s s e d to
t h e FHA*

Th e risk of living- be y o n d life
e x p e c t a n c y is shared
by th e FH A
and th e f i n ancial institution.
Th e financial institution
p r o fits if the h o m eowner does
not survive to iife expectancy.

Th e risk, of l i ving b e y o n d life
e x p e c t a n c y is sh a r e d by th e FHA
and the financial institution.
Th e financial institution
pr o fits if the h o m e o w n e r does
not surv i v e l ife e x p e c t a n c y (but
leas so than th e SI plan).

SSI

MORTALITY
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2 *1

Economic Basis for Home Equity Conversion
The socio-economic need for home equity conversion can be

deduced

from Modigliani

hypothesis.

and Brumberg1s

(1954)

life cycle

The life cycle hypothesis ("LCH") states that

individuals during their productive years will increase their
wealth and during their non-productive years will deplete that
wealth*

As explained by Modigliani (1975), if one dismisses

the bequest motive then

all

individuals

have

a

lifetime

marginal rate of consumption of one (i.e., consumption equals
income) . During the working years, individuals allocate their
income between consumption and savings based on the present
value of futureexpected income,
remain

constant for the

so that consumption

person's entire lifetime.

can

After

retirement, the individual depletes the wealth accumulated
during

working

yearswith

no

appreciable

change

in

consumption.
Shortly after the formulation of the LCH, Friedman (1957)
introduced the permanent income hypothesis ("PIH").

The PIH

assumes that each household possesses an array of assets,
human and non-human, from which it expects to receive a stream
of returns.

Returns from each asset are discounted by an

appropriate discount rate; the rate for non-marketable assets
may

be

extremely

high

(as high as

33.3

percent).

The

discounted returns produce a value to each asset.

Each

asset's value is multiplied by its appropriate discount rate
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to derive the permanent income from that asset.
the permanent

income

permanent income.

from all

assets

The sum of

is the household's

Friedman suggested that consumption is

dependent on the household's permanent income.
Modigliani and Ando (1960) suggested that although the
two hypotheses are different, they lead to many of the same
results.8

For example, they noted that under both hypotheses

the saving income ratio increases with income (p. 93)*

They

recognize that it is extremely difficult to test the two
hypotheses,
variables.

since both are based
Consequently,

many

largely on unobservable
researchers

test

for

a

reduction in wealth during retirement.
The LCH assumes that wealth will be depleted during
retirement, while the PIH assumes wealth will remain constant.
Research findings have not been conclusive.

One problem is

that facts can often be interpreted differently.

Disparate

interpretations may support conflicting conclusions.

For

example Mirer (1979) and Dicks-Mireaux and King (1984) argued
that when the actuarial value of Social Security and other
annuity income is included in the calculation of wealth, there
is clear evidence that wealth does decline during retirement.
In

contrast,

Bernheim

(1987)

argued

that

in testing the

hypotheses, the capitalized value of the current return from

8Modigliani (1975) reinforced these views and noted that
assuming expected lifetimes were infinite, PIH and LCH lead to
about the same results.
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annuities should be used.9

It may be inappropriate to use

annuities to compare the two hypotheses.

Under the PIH, the

entire annuity would likely be considered permanent income
although it is a depleting asset*
Based on the LCH, one would conclude that home ownership
would increase with age and then decrease after retirement.
As indicated by two studies, the evidence is mixed.

Li (1977)

used logit analysis to find the factors that influence home
ownership in Boston and Baltimore.

The variables examined

were income, age of head of household, family size, and race.
Li found a life cycle effect.

As a family gets older and

larger during the early years of marriage, the probability of
home ownership increases, as family size gets smaller from
ages

45-64,

decreases

the

further

probability

decreases.

The

for two-person households

probability

over age

65.

While consistent with a life cycle effect on savings and
overall consumption, these studies are not conclusive.

The

results may be confounded by a life cycle effect of housing
needs.
Chen and Jensen (1985) used a logit model to estimate the
likelihood

of

"using"

home

equity

by

employing

various

9He argues that if annuities yielded more than the
appropriate interest rate, then a person would put all of
their assets in annuities.
However, This argument does not
appear to persuasive. Insurance companies sell their annuity
products on the basis of achieving a higher current return
than could be earned by investing in bonds.
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measures of demographic characteristics, as well as income,
and wealth.

Of the 1,706 households studied,

percent used their home equity.

77 or 4.5

Using home equity included

(1) taking out a second mortgage, (2) adding a home addition
or repair into an existing mortgage, or (3) using home equity
as security for a consumer loan.

Mortgage refinancing would

have been included had there been any cases in the data set.
They found that elderly had a low likelihood of using equity
regardless of marital status, retirement status, or income
level.

They concluded that older homeowners do not rely on

dissavings to fund current consumption.

The authors noted

that there are two important limitations to their research due
to the lack of available data:

(1) the inability to include

sale of the home as a use and

(2) the inability to find

whether a use was voluntary or involuntary.

An interesting

finding in the study is that even given the same wealth,
higher income persons are more likely to borrow than middle
income persons.
borrow.

Low income persons are most likely to

The authors theorize that this may be due to higher

income individuals being more likely to take on risk (p. 51)
or

that

financing

individuals

(p.

is

55) .

more

available

Artie

and

to

Variya

upper

(1978)

income
using

a

theoretical model hypothesized that consumer durables have a
constraining effect on consumption allocation.
ability

to

borrow

against

equity

14

in

the

The restricted
home

leads

to

discontinuities in the life cycle consumption profile.
hypothesis

This

is inconsistent with the findings of Chen and

Jensen (1985). Chen and Jensen concluded that the liquid to
total asset ratio is not a significant predictor in their
model.
From the aforementioned discussion, one might infer that
for home equity conversion to be effective, the LCH must be
correct.

After all, if the elderly do not decrease wealth

over time, they do not need home equity conversion.

However,

under Friedman's PIH, home equity conversion would be useful.
If home equity were to be converted into a life annuity, the
stream of income from the annuity would be included in the
homeowner's

permanent

homeowner's consumption.

income,

thereby,

increasing

the

In short, home equity conversion

would increase consumption under either theory.
2•2

Need for Home Equity Conversion
Underlying home equity conversion is the premise that the

home is a major source of wealth of many, if not most, elderly
Americans.

Home equity represents over 40 percent of the net

worth of the elderly (U.S. Senate Committee on the Aging et
al. 1991, 75).

Home equity conversion provides a mechanism

for the elderly to consume their home equity during retirement
without having to give up their home.

Much of the research

on the need for home equity conversion is based on demographic
data.

For example, Springer (1985) also pointed out that home
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equity represented 42 percent of the elderly*s net worth in
1975. He also noted that a 1979 survey showed that over 70
percent of the elderly owned their own homes and of the 70
percent, over 80 percent owned their homes without a mortgage.
Some, primarily the unmarried, have no home equity at all.
But, for those that do, home equity conversion could increase
household income up to 40 percent

(those with the lowest

incomes).
Similarly, Howard (1987) analyzed the raw data on 351
homeowners in. Columbus, Ohio, selected from the public-use
data

tape

of

the

1982

Annual

Housing

Survey.

selected were all over 65 and owned a home.
three possible plans:
SL.

Subjects

She examined

deferred loans for home repairs, SI and

Thirty-one percent of the single homeowners

and

10

percent of the married homeowners lived below the poverty line
and older persons had lower incomes than younger persons
(showing a LCH effect) .

There was a significant, but not

extremely large correlation between home equity and income
(r=.52), suggesting that a substantial number of the elderly
poor live in homes with substantial value.

She found that 25

percent of the sampled population indicated an interest in a
HEC plan.

She concluded that due to the diversity of the

needs of the elderly, none of the plans can be assumed to be
superior to the others.
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Gasper (1984)

simulated the addition of a ten-year term

reverse mortgage10 on data received from the Social Security
Administration's Longitudinal Retirement History Study which
began in 1969. Annuity payments would have resulted in an 11
to 18 percent increase in median real cash flow and between 25
and 35 percent of the

individuals in poverty would have moved

above the poverty line due to the payments.

Median net worth

would have increased 33 percent over the decade, while only 12
percent of the individuals would have reduced their net worth.
Speare (1992) used data from the 1984 Panel of the Survey
of Income and Program Participation developed by the Bureau of
Census.

He

adjusted

the

data

to

assume

that

elderly

homeowners would have received a 9 percent FHA home equity
conversion mortgage (with $1,500 of closing costs and $25 per
month service fee).

Speare found that the percentage of

households increasing their household income (after adjustment
for existing mortgage payments) increased from 6.9 percent of
those between 65 and 69 to 66.8 percent of those aged 85 and
over.

Also,

22 percent of the households with household

income below the poverty threshold would now be above the
threshold with the home equity conversion mortgage*

This is

much lower than Gasper (1984), but still significant.

10Annuity payments were computed to result in a mortgage
balance of eighty percent of the current value of the home at
the end of the ten-year period.
This mortgage is far less
attractive to the homeowner than the FHA plan*
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Jacobs

(1987)

found that

the homeowner's

additional

annuity obtained from home equity conversion would be an
effective way to finance long term care for the elderly*
Jacobs assumed that the money obtained from the annuity would
be used for long term care.

Two econometric studies suggest

that Jacob's assumption may not be valid.
(1989)

Katsura et al.

combining simulation with a proprietary econometric

model examined the impact on the quality of housing of four
alternative policies:

(1) expanded housing vouchers for low-

income elderly renters,
homeowners,

(3)

(2)

expanded

housing vouchers

availability

of

for elderly

HECMs,

and

(4)

congregate housing vouchers for low-income impaired elderly.
They concluded that expanded HECMs would not significantly
improve the quality of housing,

because most of the cash

received would be used for living expenses and not re-invested
in

housing.

Rivlin

et

al.

(1988)

explored

various

alternatives for financing long-term (i.e., nursing home) care
for

the

elderly.

econometric model.

A

HECM

was

added

to

a

proprietary

They wanted to know if the availability of

the HECM would appreciably affect the purchase of long term
care insurance.
purchasing

They found that the percentage of the elderly

long

significantly

term

unless

care
the

insurance
proceeds

would

of

specifically designated for the insurance.
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the

not

increase

annuity

were

Although there may be a need for home equity conversion,
the research does not indicate that there is a large demand.
Chen (1973) surveyed a stratified sample of 455 homeowners
aged 55 to 75 in Los Angeles County.

He found that only 9

percent of those interviewed would be interested in a HEC
program similar to an SI in which the homeowner would be
responsible for all expenses.

There may be several reasons

for this apparent lack of interest.
emotional ties to the homestead,

Among them could be (1)
(2) poor information or

understanding of the plan, and (3) a perception that Chen's
proposal

made

poor

economic

sense.

Seventeen

percent

indicated that they would not live long enough to get money
out of the plan and 16 percent indicated that there was not
enough income.

Weinrobe

(1987)

analyzed the data using a

probit model and found that older and poorer persons were more
likely to convert and single persons were more likely to
convert than married persons.

Elderly who rely on a child as

a principal advisor were unlikely to convert*
More recent studies have shown an increase in homeowner
interest in these plans.
Ithaca,

New York,

About four years later, a study in

modeled on Chen's work,

found that

31

percent of homeowners over age 65 were interested in home
equity conversion (Nelson 1980, 15) . Nelson suggests that two
reasons may account for the difference in results:
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the Ithaca

survey was limited to those over age 65 and there was rapid
inflation during the intervening period.
A survey of 549 Wisconsin homeowners aged 65 and over
indicated

that

interested"

44

percent

were

in one

or more

of

reverse mortgage

"interested"

the

following HEC

"very
plans:

[term mortgage], reverse annuity mortgage

[tenure mortgage], SL, and tax postponement
The

or

SL model was the most popular with

(Nelson 1980).

over 27 percent

interest? 26 percent had an interest in tax postponement; and
16 percent showed interest in each of the mortgage plans.
Nelson noted that those with the greatest need for home equity
conversion (widows over 75 living alone with income of less
than $5,000)

were the least likely to be interested.

He

surmised that this might be due to lack of understanding of
the plans.

Kummerow (1980), using the same data, found that

interest in HEC plans, and in particular the tax postponement
plan,

increases with

income and education.

This may be

similar to the effect found in Chen and Jensen

(1985) and

suggests that upper income homeowners may be interested in
home equity conversion as an additional vehicle in personal
financial planning.
Venti

and

Wise

(1990)

developed

a

simultaneous

equations model for estimating the desire to change principal
residences.
evaluates

An assumption of the model is that a household
its

optimal

housing
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needs

against

its

current

housing each period, based on its current circumstances.

The

family moves if the household receives an economic benefit
from moving,

above the transaction costs

(which includes

parameters for family status) * Venti and Wise ("V & W") then
applied the model to 3,423 families in the Social Security
Retirement History Survey, which covered the years 1969 to
1979

in bi-annual

increments.

They found that only 7.5

percent of the retired homeowners tended to move during a twoyear period, with 15 percent moving during periods of shocks
(such as change in marital status or retirement). Contrary to
the life cycle hypothesis, V & W concluded that there is no
evidence that the elderly wish to reduce their housing equity;
rather,

there

is a tendency to want to

increase housing

equity.

Although some families, particularly those with low

income and high housing equity, reduce their equity, this is
more than offset by other elderly that increase their equity.
V & W further noted that transaction costs may prevent some
families from reducing home equity.

This could be corrected

by home equity conversion, but they questioned whether the
demand was sufficient to support an active market.
two significant biases in their research.

There are

First, they exclude

families that moved to a rental unit on their first move from
the sample.

Considering the low probability of moving, the

elimination of those that clearly reduced their housing equity
is a significant bias.

In addition, the results may be biased
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due to the inflation in housing values during the period
combined with a poor stock market*

Changes in housing wealth

may be due more to fluctuating prices than increasing housing
stock.

V & W

(1991)

reverse mortgages.

further explored the viability of

First, they replicated the 1990 experiment

using the 1984 Survey of Income and Program Participation,
provided by the Bureau of the Census and found consistent
results.

As additional evidence they show that housing wealth

among homeowners is relatively constant with age (with a very
small downward drift).

They also found that the correlation

between liquid wealth and housing wealth was almost zero,
suggesting no substitution effect. From this they conclude
that the elderly would not want reverse mortgages, even if
they could get them.

They

concluded that the amount of a

reverse mortgage annuity is not large enough to be significant
to the average elderly homeowner.

Speare (1992) pointed out

that this conclusion assumes a much lower interest rate than
is normally used to discount the value of the house.

Speare

suggested that although the lower rate is appropriate for
commercial annuities, it may not be appropriate for reverse
annuity mortgages.

Speare also noted that the conclusion is

biased, since V & W include persons aged 55 to 64 in some of
their calculations.

Higgins and Folts (1992) computed the

annuity payable using various

reverse mortgage plans

and

concluded that, except for the extremely elderly, the equity
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of most "house rich cash poor" elderly would not support large
annuity payments.

However, they note:

The real value of a small increase in monthly
disposable income is a matter of perspective.
For
someone who lives at the margin of economic
independence, an additional several dollars each
month may represent much, indeed, (p. 199).
V & W (1991) acknowledge that the vast majority of the
elderly1s wealth is in Social Security (89 percent receive
benefits) and private pensions (59 percent receive benefits).
The

decline

in the value

of the benefits with age,

and

therefore the total wealth of the elderly, is consistent with
the life cycle hypothesis.
may

The importance of pension benefits

also suggest that although

the elderly may

not want

additional income, they may be interested in the inflation
protection of the SL and SI plans.
Theconclusions of Venti and Wise (1990, 1991)
surprising.

Convenient forms of HEC for

generally available.

are not

the elderly are not

The standard home mortgage and the home

equity loan generally have the following characteristics that
make them inappropriate to use as a HEC device:
(1) They do not provide for life tenancy.

If payments

are not made when due, foreclosure can

force the

homeowner from the home.
(2)

They require the homeowner to establish that the
loan can be repaid from future
of the equity in the home).
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income (and not out

The essence of home equity conversion is that the elderly
homeowner generally will not take any action that will affect
life tenure in the home.

In addition, the homeowner does not

have the income to repay the loan and must rely on the equity
in the home itself for repayment.
be

inappropriate.

unavailable,

the

Since
data

The use of prior data may

home

may

be

equity
biased

conversion's omission from the database.
homeowners

failure

to

reduce

home

conversion
by

home

was

equity

The reason for

equity may

be

due

to

unavailability of an acceptable vehicle for doing so.
2.3

Policy Issues
To a large extent, the success of home equity conversion

may depend more on certain policy issues than on whether it is
a viable product.

For example, if the income tax rules are

uncertain, then financial institutions would be reluctant to
offer products and homeowners may be unwilling to consider
that which is offered.
The policy issues discussed are:
Accounting issues;
Income tax issues?
Social welfare issues;
Liquidity issues? and
Profitability issues.
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2.3.1

Accounting Issues
Accounting policy issues center on two areas.

clarity

of

the

accounting treatment.

If

the

First is
accounting

treatment of a HEC vehicle is either uncertain or cumbersome,
financial institutions may resist offering that vehicle.

The

second issue is whether the accounting treatment for a vehicle
reflects its ability to generate future cash flows.

If the

accounting treatment differs from the expected cash flows, not
only will this conflict with the precepts of FASB Statement of
AccountingConcepts No.

1

(Para.

25) , but

may

discourage

financial institutions from offering the vehicle.

It has been

shown that regulated financial institutions will sacrifice
cash flow so as to maintain regulatory income.

(Scholes,

Wilson, and Wolfson 1989) .
An example of the effects of uncertain and unfavorable
accounting

rules

publicly held

is

Providential

company

formed

Corporation,

for the purpose

conventional (non-insured) reverse mortgages.
prospectus on February 10, 1992.

the
of

first
issuing

It issued its

There was no problem with

the company's accounting treatment ofits reverse mortgage
portfolio.

In a letter dated July 14, 1992, the

Securities

and Exchange Commission ("SEC11) notified the company that it
must change it method of accounting for reverse mortgages.
The

SEC

advised

that

in

accruing

income

from

reverse

mortgages, the company was permitted to incorporate actual
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increases in underlying property values, but was required to
incorporate decreases in projected property values.
increases

in property values were precluded.

Projected
After

the

announcement, Providential stock dropped from around 11 to 6
1/2, although it had actual cash of $11 per share.11

After

negotiations, the company agreed that the new rules would be
effective for loans issued after January 1, 1992. For prior
loans,

interest

could continue

to accrue until

the

loan

balance exceeds 70 percent of the home's fair market value
(Providential 1992b).
Due to pressure from the American Association of Retired
Persons (AARP), the SEC changed its mind, issuing a memorandum
outlining its new position
memorandum,

(Harney 1992).

The nine point

which applies to uninsured reverse mortgages,

permits the use of projected property values in computing
income (SEC 1992).

It requires an annual calculation of the

actual and expected return from each mortgage pool using
appropriate statistical techniques (Monte Carlo simulation is
specifically mentioned) for projected future cash flows.

If

the expected return from a pool is either higher or lower than
the previous year,
appropriately.

the

income

For example,

from the pool
assume

is adjusted

a mortgage pool

projected to return 9 percent at the end of 1992.

After

11Greenberg, Herb. "Reverse Mortgages Hit by SEC,"
San Francisco Chronicle. 29 July 1992, B1.
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was

The

including actual 1993 cash flow and revising assumptions on
projected home values and based on actual life expectancy, the
return

is

expected

to

be

10

percent.

The

financial

institution would report income from reverse mortgages in 1993
as

the

total

amount

that

would

have

accrued

since

the

beginning of the mortgage using a rate of 10 percent less the
total amounts accrued in 1992 and prior years.
The memorandum also provides seven disclosures that are
required in the footnotes of the financial statement. These
include, for example, the accounting policy used, statistical
methods, and nature and source of significant assumptions.

It

also requires a sensitivity analysis showing the impact on the
effective yield, net income and retained earnings assuming
property values do not change or that property values increase
at one percentage point less than projections.
According to the President's letter in Providential1s
1992 annual report, the new rules did not significantly affect
Providential1s earnings.
at the end of

1992.

Providential stock closed at 8 3/4
Providential

claims that potential

lenders are weary about extending financing, fearing that the
SEC might change its mind.12

The SEC rulings may have hurt

others in the industry as well.

American Homestead Inc. had

been the first reverse mortgage lender in 1983, but had been

12"Reverse Mortgage Lender Still Has Trouble," National
Mortgage News, 3 May 1993, p. 5.
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inactive for a few years. An initial public offering was
registered with the SEC in May 1992.13
stock has not been issued.

A year later, the

Capital Holding, a large insurance

company, abandoned its reverse mortgage program after five
years.

One reason given was that the new accounting rules

diminish the profitability of the mortgages (Manning 1993).
2*3.2

Income Tax Issues
There are four basic tax policy issues that relate to

this research.

These are:

(1) ambiguous law, (2) horizontal

equity, (3) vertical equity, and (4) tax subsidy.

If the tax

law

then

relating

to

a

HEC

vehicle

is

ambiguous,

both

homeowners and financial institutions will avoid the vehicle
or seek a higher return in exchange for the higher risk.

The

tax treatment by the homeowner or the financial institution
may be ambiguous because of lack of guidance from the tax
authorities

or because of an adverse,

position taken by the tax authorities.

but challengeable,

An adverse position by

the tax authorities may also raise the question of horizontal
equity*

Horizontal equity seeks to tax similar transactions

in a similar way.

Vertical equity seeks to impose tax based

on ability to pay; persons with a greater ability to pay
should pay a higher tax.

If the government provides a tax

13W. , Michael, "Company Known for Reverse Mortgages Sets
IPO," Philadelphia Business Journal, sec. 1 p. 13.
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incentive for a particular transaction, it is known as a tax
subsidy.

Tax subsidies are often called tax expenditures.

Issues

of

ambiguous

law

and

horizontal

equity

are

addressed along with each plan discussed in this chapter.

Tax

equity and tax subsidy are tested and are discussed in the
next two chapters.

It is not possible to test horizontal

equity statistically, because each vehicle has different risk
characteristics.
2.3.3

Social Welfare Issues
The median household income of FHA HECM mortgagor is only

$7,572 and their median Social Security income is $7,005 (HUD
1992) . Thus, it is likely that many of the homeowners using
home equity conversion are eligible for public assistance.
The form of HEC affects the supplemental security income (SSI)
and other public assistance.
income test.

SSI has an asset test and an

None of the HEC plans affects the asset test;

the value of the home and other assets that are not controlled
by the recipient (e.g., annuities) are excluded from the test.
However, income received from the annuities from SLs and Sis
could be considered income for purposes of the income test,
and therefore possibly reduce SSI assistance [Scholen 1991,
45, citing 20 CFR Sec. 416.1121(c)].

There is evidence that

the Social Security Administration may be flexible on this
point.

The Social Security Administration issued a favorable

determination that annuity payments from an SI plan sponsored
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by Arkansas would not be included in income for purposes of
eligibility for SSI (ABA 1986).

Since the HECM is a loan, it

is not included in the income test.

Note, however, that if

part of the annuity received by the homeowner under any of the
three plans is not expended, then the cash received and the
income thereon is included in the asset and income tests.
Although state assistance laws often follow federal standard,
some state assistance programs might have different qualifying
tests.
2*3.4

Liquidity Issues
There is anecdotal evidence suggesting that one obstacle

to increased availability of home equity conversions is the
lack of liquidity to the financial institution.
1992,

the

Federal

National

Mortgage

As of August

Association

(FNMA)

purchased about 94 percent of the FHA HECM mortgages issued
(HUD 1992, p. 3-14).

The remaining 6 percent are either in

process or are loans that FNMA would not accept.

HUD (pp. 3-

14 to 15) recognizes the importance of the secondary market in
developing the product

(implying that FNMA has essentially

dictated the market terms). HUD also notes the importance of
securitization.

It further notes that FNMA does not believe

that the FHA mortgage can be securitized*

Therefore, HUD

concludes that due to the annuity-like structure of reverse
mortgages,

insurance companies are likely to be the only

investors comfortable with the variable payment stream.
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2.3.5

Profitability Issues
The FHA HEC project is designed to break-even (HUD 1990,

p. 3-10)*

If the project is unprofitable, the cost will be

borne by the taxpayer.

In addition,

government programs

normally should be employed to supplement and not compete with
the

private

sector.

An

unprofitable

discourage private companies

FHA

program

may

from entering into the home

equity conversion market.
The FHA program has been criticized for being too liberal
in its assumptions (see, e.g., Speare (1992).

Phillips (1991,

37) , an executive of Capital Holding Corporation, a private
HECM lender (at that time), had the following comments:
[B]eing in the reverse mortgage business is sort of
like being in the jungle with an 800 pound gorilla.
As long as the gorilla is going 'the way you want
him to, it's helpful to follow along through a
cleared path.
But if the gorilla decides to turn
on us, we're dead. . . . FHA is largely confining
its activities to the neediest homeowners whose
home values are too small to make a private program
worthwhile, at least for now.
. . .
So far,
segmentation has limited most of our cost and
design concerns about the FHA program to a question
of how much it will ultimately cost us as
taxpayers.
Szymanoski

(1992), who developed the FHA plan, admits

that some FHA assumptions may be too liberal and cites two
reasons

for

this.

First,

liberal

counterbalanced by conservative assumptions*

assumptions

are

For example, not

all homeowners will use the maximum benefits allowed under the
plan, either by election or by owning a home with a value of
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over the FHA limits.
provides

Second, whereas the forward FHA program

for a refund to qualifying homeowners of excess

premiums collected, this does not exist for the HECM program.
Such a policy imposes a greater duty to avoid overcharging
premiums,

particularly

where

the

borrowers

are

poor

and

elderly.
Expanding on this duty, Szymanoski

(1993b) appears to

make the argument that the FHA1s market is the elderly poor
and that the private market should limit itself to the upper
and middle classes:
I smile when 1 recall Bill [Phillips'] metaphor of
the 800 pound gorilla.
Bill's comments I think
were made in the context of a business "competitor18
who
did
not
really
appreciate
the
market
segmentation between his product and the FHA
program. He is not the only person to have pointed
out some of FHA1s generous assumptions . . ., but
he clearly has not recognized that FHA1s market is
much lower in income than Capital Holding's market.
I've always felt that this market segmentation
justifies FHA's use of more liberal underwriting
assumptions, particularly with regard to mortality
assumptions.
Even if it is assumed that liberal assumptions are permitted,
it is important to know what the effects of the assumptions
are to the profitability of the entire model.

The overview of

the assumptions of the FHA model later in this chapter will
include the specific criticisms of the model.
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2 .4

Home Ecniitv Conversion Mortgages
The home equity conversion mortgage ("HECM") is the most

common form of home equity conversion.

The HECM is often

called a reverse mortgage because it is the opposite
normal (forward) mortgage.

of a

In a forward home mortgage, the

borrower receives a lump-sum payment equal to the value of the
loan (a percentage of the home's value)

in exchange for a

contractual set of payments to be made in the future.
combining

two

formulas,14

The

amount

of

each

By

periodic

payment for a standard self-amortizing mortgage is:

14The computation is based on the standard formula for
the present value of an annuity of $1 per period (Reilly 1985,
871) :
1 -

PYAn

and the

=

--------------

1---

t~~k) ”

formula for the periodic payment is
PVA$i

Where
A is the required periodic payment;
PV$i is the present value of $1 per period;
n is the number of periodic payments required;
k is the periodic interest rate; and
P is the amount borrowed.
The computation of the formulas for determining the maximum
line of credit and the periodic payment for a term mortgage
are combined in a similar manner. The underlying components
of these mortgages will not be separately stated.
33

A = -----------------

1 -

±

( 1)
-

(1 + k)a
Where
A is the amount of the periodic payment;
P is the amount borrowed;
n is the number of periodic payments to be made; and
k is the interest rate per period.
The

repayments

include

interest

on

the

outstanding

loan

balance and the repayment of the principal for the mortgage
term.

Over time, the loan balance is reduced and at the end

of the mortgage term, the loan is paid off.

In the HECM, the

borrower receives no lump-sum payment at the inception of the
loan.

Instead, the borrower receives money periodically from

the lender, and the outstanding loan balance increases over
time due to the periodic payments and the accrual of interest.
The loan is paid-off in a lump-sum when the borrowereither
moves or dies, or at
There are

a contracted future term date.

three types of HECMs,

term, andtenure.

A line

of credit

namely lineof credit,
home equityconversion

mortgage is similar

toa standard home-equity loan.

The

principal difference

is that the line of credit HECM by its

terms need not be repaid until the borrower vacates the home
or dies.

In addition, a line of credit HECM is likely to be

without recourse.

The general formula for the amount of a

line of credit HECM is
34

P = — £
(l+k)n

(2)

Where
P is maximum allowed line of credit;
k is the interest rate per period;
n is the number of periods before the loan is due;
and
F is the amount due at the end of n periods.

A home equity conversion term mortgage, makes periodic
payments to the borrower up to a fixed due date, or the date
the borrower vacates or dies (if earlier).

If the borrower

remains in the home at the due date, most HEC term mortgages
require that the mortgage balance be repaid; however, the FHA
HEC

term

mortgage

does

borrower vacates or dies.

not

require

repayment

until

the

The formula for determining the

periodic payments of a standard home equity conversion term
mortgage (which must be repaid on a fixed date) is
A = --- — --(1+Jc) - 1

Where

A is the periodic annuity payment?
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(3)

k is the periodic interest rate?
n is the number of periods the annuity is paid; and
F is the mortgage balance at the end of period n.
The tenure mortgage, pays (actually lends) the borrower
a fixed annuity for life or until the house is vacated? it
does not matter if the mortgage principal increases above the
value of the home*

At the end of the mortgage term, the house

is sold and the mortgage is repaid.

The monthly payment for

a tenure mortgage is computed in the same way as a term
mortgage,

except

that

the

mortgagee

uses

a

formula

to

determine n (the expected number of periods the annuity is to
be paid).

Since tenure mortgages

are generally without

recourse, if the value of the home at the end of the mortgage
term is less than the mortgage principal, the property is
handed over to the lender.
The risks to a lender are different for a tenure mortgage
than for a normal forward mortgage.
no

mortgage

payments,

default

Since the borrower makes

risk

is

limited

to

the

borrower's inability to pay for property taxes, insurance, or
maintenance costs of the home.

The major risk is that the

borrower

life

will

diversifiable,
than

outlive

his/her

expectancy,

which

is

or that the home value at term will be less

projected at mortgage origination, which is partially
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diversifiable15.

In a forward mortgage the borrower is not

concerned with the financial stability of the lender, at most,
the lender can misappropriate the borrower's escrow account.
In a HECM mortgage, the borrower is concerned that the lender
won't meet

its contracted

future

annuity payments.

One

advantage of an insured HECM mortgage over a conventional
mortgage is that the insurance protects both the financial
institution and the borrower.
The remainder of this discussion is divided into the
following sections:
Conventional HECM products?
The FHA HECM?
Accounting for the insured HECM; and
Taxation of the HECM.
2-4.1

Conventional HECM Products
It

should

be

noted

at

the

outset

that

detailed

information on conventional mortgage products is often not
available.
that

do

Some programs no longer exist and most of those

exist

often

only provide

the minimum

amount

of

15The risk that an individual property increases in value
at a rate lower than the increase for property values in
general is largely diversifiable.
That portion of the risk
that represents a skewness in expected returns in relation to
the variance in property value increases is not diversif iable.
In addition, the risk that overall property values do not
increase at the rate expected is a non-diversifiable market
risk.
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disclosure required by law.

Details of specific assumptions

and methods are considered proprietary.
The earliest reverse mortgage programs often looked much
like their forward mortgage counterparts.

A prominent example

of this type of program was the Reverse Annuity Mortgage
("RAM") Program of the San Francisco Development Fund.

The

RAM program was structured so that the agency acted as a
broker between the elderly homeowner and the provider of
funds.

The total number of loans originated under the plan

was 234 (Weinrobe 1988).

These were fixed rate mortgages with

a maximum maturity of 12 years (but 10 years was the longest
term generally suggested). Loans were due at maturity even if
the homeowner were still living in the house.

The maximum

final loan balance was limited to the smaller of 80 percent of
the initial property value or $150,000.
balance

of

less

than

$50,000

were

Loans with a final

not

accepted.

Loans

generally provided for level monthly payments for the period
of the loan, although a graduated payment schedule (in which
payments increased by 6 percent per year) was also available
(Weinrobe 1987).
Assuming the home is an investment, Tate (1987) examined
HECMs

from

the

homeowner's

perspective.

An

underlying

assumption was that the home is leased to a third party at
fair market value) . First, he found that the internal rate of
return ("IRR") of a typical home in Orlando, Florida is 8.92
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percent plus the inflation rate, yielding an expected return
of 13.12 percent with a standard deviation of about 1 percent
(after transaction costs) .
percent interest rate*

He then added a HECM with a 10

In general, he found, as would be

expected, that if the IRR on the property is higher than 10
percent, the HECM results in a higher rate of return on the
investment.

Surprisingly, the addition of the HECM did not

materially affect the expected return its standard deviation.
Finally, he concluded that the risk adjusted rate of return on
home ownership was favorable when compared to alternative
investments
index).

(the risk free investment and the S & P 500
His

standpoint,

study

using

suggests

home

equity

that
for

from

an

additional

investment
income

is

preferable to disposing of the equity and using the proceeds
to rent.
The typical term reverse mortgage had drawbacks to both
the homeowner and the financial institution.

If the homeowner

lived beyond the term of the loan the homeowner could be
forced

out

of

the

house

by

foreclosure.

Due

to

the

conservative terms of the mortgages, the financial institution
had little default risk on the mortgages (see Weinrobe 1988).
However, it was placed in the unenviable position of being the
"Scrooge11 that evicts an elderly widow from her home
Archer and Nye 1987).

(see

Two economic studies of home equity

conversion investigated the insurance premium needed to insure
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a term HECM.

Weinrobe (1988) noted that the Florida Home

Equity Conversion Act,

Sections 697.202 - 697.206 Florida

Statutes (1986) authorized an insurance program to guarantee
lenders against default for a term HECM with requirements
similar to that in the RAM program.16

As noted by Weinrobe

(p. 647), this would only insure against depreciating home
values.

Using simulation, he explored the economics to the

insurer of three possible insured plans: (1) a ten-year term
HECM with the full amount due at the end of the term (similar
to the Florida program) ? (2) a term HECM with ten years of
annuity

payment

completed;

and

and
(3)

deferred

repayment

a tenure mortgage.

when
In

tenure

is

addition,

he

investigated a modified second plan in which the insurer is
assumed to purchase the mortgage at the end of the term
instead of providing insurance.

In each of the four cases, an

annuity payment would be provided that results in a mortgage
balance equal to 80 percent of the current home value at the
end of the term (or the homeowner's life expectancy with a
tenure mortgage).

He examined the required premium for these

models for a 75 year old woman assuming various rates of
increase in the value of the home.
a tenure mortgage would require

an

For example, he found that
up-front insurance charge

16The insurance program was never implemented (July 10,
1993 telephone interview with Mary Ann Hoffman, Community
Assistance Consultant, Florida Housing Finance Agency).
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of 5.8 percent of the home value, or an annual fee of 0.6
percent of the disbursements paid.
Archer and Nye (1987) developed a model for pricing the
insurance for an unusual HECM? the model assumes the lender is
the insurer*

They assumed that a lump-sum HECM, in which a

lump-sum is provided which would result in a terminal value
equal to the expected value of the home when tenure is deemed
to end and would produce an insurance premium of zero.

Like

Weinrobe (1988), they used simulation, varying the assumptions
of their model.
(i.e.,

the

assumptions,

They noted that the maximum net benefit

lump-sum payment)
particularly

for

is

sensitive

younger

to

changes

homeowners*

in
For

example, they found that a one percentage point increase in
pre-death terminations would increase the maximum net benefit
by over 10 percent for homeowners under age seventy.

Also, by

using an annuity table to find life expectancy instead of life
tables would reduce payments by 22 percent for ages 60-69 and
13 percent for ages over 90.
American Homestead, Inc. was one of the first to offer a
HECM that guaranteed payments for life.

American Homestead

began research on HECMs in 1981 (when the RAM program began).
In late 1983 American Homestead introduced its reverse shared
appreciation mortgage

(RSAM), which it called The Century

41

Plan™

(Leban

1984).17

Garnett

and

Guttentag

(1984)

developed a simulation model to evaluate a RSAM based on
American Homestead's parameters.

Clearly the model, which was

essentially a capital budgeting model, was used to develop
American Homestead's plan.

The

main features of Homestead's

RSAM were that it guaranteed life tenure in the home and life
time payments

(unless the homeowner sold the home) .

provide a reasonable

income to the homeowner,

To

the lender

participated in the appreciation of the house (a 50 and 100
percent

options

determined

were

using

sex

available).
based

1971

Life

expectancy

Annuity

Tables.

was
An

undisclosed factor for move-outs was used, but the probability
for move-out was reduced as the amount of the homeowner's
equity was reduced.

American Homestead no longer offers a

reverse mortgage product.

As discussed in Section 2.3.1,

American Homestead registered an initial public offering with
the SEC in early 1992,

presumably to begin offering more

reverse mortgages, but the stock was never issued.
In 1985, Capital Holding Corporation, a large insurance
company, instituted its HECM, which it called the Home Income
Security

Plan.

The plan provided

a tenure

home

equity

conversion mortgage (i.e. , the payments continued and the loan
was not repaid until the homeowner dies, sells the house, or

17Leban, Vice President and Corporate Counsel of American
Homestead Mortgage Corporation, also summarizes the problems,
including legal problems, in developing the product.
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permanently moves away). The plan charged an up front "fixed
premium"

of 7 percent of the home value to pay for risk

pooling.

In addition it charged a $100 application fee and

$3,000 in closing costs.
premium

If cash advances did not exceed the

plus closing costs at the end of the mortgage, the

excess was refunded.

Interest accrued at 2.5 percentage

points over the ten-year U.S. Treasury securities rate and was
adjusted annually.

At the end of the loan, the amount that

must be repaid was the least of the following three amounts:
(1)

the loan balance? (2) 93 percent of the fair market value

of the house when the loan is repaid? or (3) the initial value
of the house at the time the loan was made increased by a rate
equal to the increase in the Consumer Price Index plus 1.3
percent.

The company allowed a homeowner to mortgage only a

certain portion of the property*

For example, a homeowner may

set aside 25 percent of the value of the home.

All mortgage

calculations would be made on 75 percent of the value.

When

the home is sold, again all mortgage calculations would be
based on a 75 percent

interest

in the home;

twenty-five

percent of the sale proceeds would go to the homeowner or the
homeowner's beneficiaries (Scholen 1991? 1992, 250-260)*
stated

in Section

2.3.1,

in April

decided to cease its HECM product.

1993,

Capital

As

Holding

It cited as reasons (1)

the lack of consumer interest, (2) an expected lower increase
in

home

values,

and

(3)

unfavorable
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accounting

rules,

particularly

relating

to

the

7

percent

"fixed

premium"

(Manning 1993).
Providential

Corporation

markets

mortgage, primarily in California.
tenure mortgage in 1988.

a

tenure

reverse

It introduced its first

The mortgage was similar to that

offered by American Homestead (Klein and Simians 1993, 34).
The mortgage contains a set aside feature similar to Capital
Holding's.

Unlike Capital Holding, the mortgage is a fixed

rate mortgage that generally has a higher rate than typical
forward mortgages.

In addition, mortgages issued before 1991

contained a shared appreciation provision, which Providential
calls a "Premium.11

Providential suspended funding of its

reverse mortgage in October 1990 due to lack of funding.
During the three-year period it made 748 loans (out of 30,000
inquiries).

As stated in Section 2.3.2, Providential made an

initial public offering in early 1992 to provide funding for
additional loans.

According to its prospectus (Providential

1992), it expects that new loans will be similar to the pre1991 loans, except that the Premium will be a fixed charge
payable over the term of the mortgage instead of a percentage
of the appreciation in the property.
In

March

1993,

Transamerica

announced

that

it

was

entering the reverse mortgage market with the Home Income
Plan.

This plan is interesting because it was specifically

designed to be securitized.

The mortgage generally requires
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an initial home value of at least $125,000, which is generally
above the FHA limit.

The mortgage is divided into three

parts:

(1) a lump-sum payment, (2) a reserve account, and (3)

a

annuity.

life

The

lump-sum payment

for

a previously

unmortgaged home must be at least $1,000 and less than 8
percent of the loan value.

The reserve account, which is

limited to the lesser of $7,500 or 3 percent of the equity in
the home, is designed to cover unexpected expenses.

Unlike a

line of credit, the reserve account cannot be reborrowed? once
drawn, amounts can be repaid, but not reborrowed.

The unused

portion of the reserve account available increases by 3.5
percent a year.

The annuity feature of the mortgage

different from other reverse mortgages.

is

Instead of the lender

making monthly payments to the borrower, the lender purchases
an annuity from an insurance company.

An advantage of this is

that the annuity is for life and does not end if the house is
sold. (Transamerica Homefirst [1993]).

Transamerica fails to

mention three major disadvantages to the use of an annuity:
(1) The annuity not only has an initial

closing fee,

but probably is based on a lower interest rate than
the mortgage;
(2) Unlike mortgage payments, the annuity payments may
not be considered income for purposes
public assistance eligibility; and
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of computing

(3)

Unlike mortgage payments, the interest portion of
the annuity payments

is subject to

federal

and

under

the

possibly state income taxes.
Ignoring

property

value

limitations,

payments

Transamerica plan, given the same interest rates, are similar
to FHA*s.

Using an example

furnished by the company,18

monthly payments would be about 4 percent lower than under the
FHA plan.
2*4.2

The FHA HECM
In 1987 Congress authorized a demonstration project in

which HUD could insure 2,500 HECMs through September 30, 1991
(HUD 1990, 1-3).

This program was later increased to allow 25

thousand HECMs through September 30, 1995 (Roma 1991).

As of

mid-August 1992, 2,155 loans had been closed and 367 loans
were

being

processed

and there were

52

lenders19

in
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states offering the FHA HECM mortgage (FHA 1992, ES-1 and ES2).

As stated in Section 2.3.4, nearly all HECM loans are

eventually

purchased

Association (FNMA).

by

the

Federal

National

Mortgage

Wendover Funding, a North Carolina firm

manages servicing for most HECM lenders.

Wendover services or

sub-services loans for 45 of the 57 institutions that have
participated in the program.

18Data comes from a one page undated news announcement by
Transamerica Homefirst.
19Since inception, 57 lenders have participated in the
program.
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Apparently most

lenders do not consider the reverse

mortgage program to be a major profit center,

since most

lenders transfer both the mortgages and servicing to a third
party,

Although many lenders are interested in the future

market potential of the product, most

lenders view public

service as the primary reason for participation, according to
the FHA.

Lenders subject to the Community Reinvestment Act

("CRA”) view the program as a safe way to improve their CRA
ratings.

Finally, lenders believe that they receive positive

public relations from participating in the program (HUD 1992,
pp. 3-1 to 3-5).
The FHA demonstration project provides the homeowner with
a choice of

three

credit mortgage,
mortgage.

non-recourse mortgages:
(2)

a term mortgage,

and

(1)
(3)

a line of
a tenure

Under the FHA program, the homeowner is required to

repay the loan only if the homeowner dies or if the property
is not owned and properly maintained20 as the homeowner's
principal residence,21 but may be pre-paid, without penalty,

20The lender can foreclose on the property if taxes and
insurance are not being paid or if the homeowner fails to make
repairs necessary to keep the property in an "acceptable"
condition (HUD 1989, p. 9-16).
2■’■Homeowners are required to certify annually that the
home is maintained as a principal residence and should advise
the lender of all absences from the home in excess of two
months (HUD 1989, p. 9-15). HUD notes that if the mortgage
balance exceeds the value of the property, borrowers or their
heirs may be tempted to fraudulently claim the house as a
principal residence. HUD suggests that after the program is
active for a number of years, it may wish to check residence
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at any time (HUD 1989, pp. 9-14 to 9-16) . For term and tenure
mortgages, the borrower may elect a line of credit set aside,
but no set aside from the lien of a portion of the house (as
allowed by Capital Holding and Providential) is permitted.22
The line of credit can be combined with either a term or
tenure mortgage.

Of the initial 2,155 borrowers, 51.2 percent

elected the line of credit mortgage, 15.7 percent elected the
term mortgage

and

10.4

elected the tenure mortgage;

the

remaining 22.7 percent elected a term or tenure mortgage with
a line of credit set aside (HUD 1992, p. 2-18).
The remaining part of this section describe the borrower
qualifications and loan limits, interest and other charges,
FHA's model assumptions, and computation of the FHA HECM.
2.4.2.1

Borrower Qualifications and Loan Limits

To be eligible for a reverse mortgage, a borrower must be
at least age 62 and occupy the home as a principal residence.
The property must be a single family residence23 free of
prior liens and must meet HUD property standards (including
HUD qualification of condominium associations and planned unit

information against social security and tax records.
22A lien set aside is probably not a significant feature
due to the low property limits on FHA loans.
23HUD (1990, p. 4-7) notes that a self contained rental
unit in the home would disqualify the property, but a rented
room would not. Although a duplex would generally not qualify
for a mortgage, if a separate legal description can be written
for one half the property, then the HECM mortgage can be
written for the half occupied by the eligible homeowner.
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developments). The program allows proceeds of the loan to be
used to pay off existing mortgages or to (a certain extent)
pay for repairs necessary to meet HUD property standards.
(HUD 1990, p.

2-2) .

Loans may be made to joint owners,

providing all owners are over age 62.

Once made the loan

would continue to qualify as long as the home was a qualified
residence for at least one joint owner.
(1990,

p.4-3)

For example, the HUD

provides as an example that four unrelated

friends would be eligible for the loan.24
FHA bases its computations on a house's "maximum claim
amount."

Generally,

the

FHA

HECM

loan

uses

the

current

appraised value of the house to determine the maximum claim
amount.

However, if the home value exceeds the maximum FHA

mortgage for a given area, the maximum claim amount equals the
amount of the FHA maximum mortgage

limitation.

The FHA

maximum mortgage limitation varies from $67,500 to $151,725
(HUD 1992, p. 1-12).
The statute authorizing the HECM demonstration requires
potential borrowers to receive counseling from an approved
third party independent of the lender (HUD 1992, p. 1-10).
Counseling focuses on the different types of HECMs available,
the suitability of the HECM for the borrower, and alternatives
to the HECM

(HUD 1989, p.

1-5).

Due to the shortage of

24It is not totally clear what would happen if one or
more of the co-owners transferred their interest to a non-coowner of the property.
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counselors,

the

counseling

requirement

has

been

criticized as creating a bottleneck in the system.

widely
HUD

recognizes that this problem has made it difficult to begin
offering FHA HECM mortgages in some areas, particularly rural
areas

(HUD 1992, pp. 4-3 to 4-4).

Most of the qualified

counseling organizations are governmental agencies or non
profit organizations that are prohibited from charging the
homeowner.

The law prohibits a lender from financing the

counseling.

While HUD reimburses these outside counselors, it

admits that the reimbursement may be less than actual costs
(HUD 1992, p. 4-5) .
4.2.2.2
The

Interest and Other Charges
FHA does not establish required

interest rates.

Interest rates may be either fixed or variable.

For variable

rates, the lender must use the one year constant maturity,
U.S. Securities, as the base rate.
annually with

The rate may be adjusted

a 2 percentage points

percentage points lifetime cap.

annual

cap and a 5

Or, it may adjust monthly

with no annual cap and a lifetime cap set by the lender (HUD
1989, p. 1-4).

Since FNMA

purchases all FHA HECM mortgages,

its policies are critical.

FNMA will only purchase variable

rate mortgages

p.

(HUD 1992,

3-14).

FNMA requires that

mortgages that adjust annually be set 160 basis points above
the base rate and mortgages that adjust monthly be set 105

50

basis

points

above

the

using

base

the

rate

variable

(Barriere

Interest

accrues

rate.

purposes

of determining amounts that may be

1991). J

However,

for

loaned,

the

mortgage is treated as if it were a fixed rate mortgage.

The

"as if" rate is the U.S. Treasury Securities rate adjusted to
a constant maturity of ten years plus the lender's margin (HUD
1989, p. 1-2).
amount

For example, for purposes of determining the

of a tenure HECM annuity that would be paid,

an

annually adjusted loan purchased by FNMA would be considered
a fixed rate loan with an interest rate 160 basis points above
the U.S.

Treasury Securities rate adjusted to a constant

maturity of ten years.

Interest would continue to accrue at

a variable rate based on the U.S. Treasury Securities rate
adjusted to a maturity of one year.
A shared appreciation mortgage is also available, but the
amount

of

original

the

appreciation

appraised value

cannot

and

exceed

cannot

25

cause

the

percent

of

effective

interest rate for the last twelve months of the loan to exceed
20 percent (HUD 1989, pp. 6-11 to 6-12) .
co-insure

shared

limitations,

and

mortgages.
because

Due in

FNMA

does

not

Lenders must also
part

to

purchase

these
shared

appreciation mortgages, not one shared appreciation mortgage
has been issued (HUD 1992, p. 3-15).

25Monthly adjustment will maximize the homeowner's loan
available under the program*
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Lenders may charge borrowers for out-of-pocket costs,
such as appraisal and title fees plus an origination fee.
Origination fees are designed to cover the lender's cost for
originating

and

closing

the

loan.

Under

FHA* s

forward

mortgage program, origination fees are limited to 1 percent of
the mortgage amount.

Under the reverse mortgage program the

fee itself is not regulated? however, the amount that can be
financed by the mortgage is limited to 1 percent of the
maximum claim amount.

HUD reports median closing costs of FHA

HECM mortgages at $2,962, with ranges from $2,000 to $4,400
(HUD 1992, p. 2-25).
FHA permits,

but does not require,

lenders to charge

borrowers a flat monthly fee for servicing the loan.
is accrued monthly as earned.

The fee

The standard fee structure

ranges from $25 to $35 per month (HUD 1992, p. 3-13).
The FHA mortgage insurance premium is 2 percent of the
maximum claim amount on origination and a monthly fee of 1/2
percent per year on the mortgage balance (HUD 1989, pp.6-8 to
6-9).

This is a lower premium than that computed by Weinrobe

(1988),

discussed in Section 2.4.1.

premium

option,

in which the

FHA offers a shared

lender participates

in the

insurance premium in exchange for taking part of the risk, but
no lender to date has agreed to participate under this option.
Under this option, the lender must hold the mortgage until
maturity.

If the premiums are not shared, the lender may
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assign the loan to the FHA any time after the balance of the
loan exceeds 98 percent of the maximum claim amount.
1992, pp. 1-15 to 1-16).

(HUD

Thus, for a $100,000 house, under

the FHA limit, the lender would have a "put" on the mortgage
once the mortgage balance exceeds $98,000. This effectively
puts a limit on the term of the loan.
4.2.2.3

FHA Model Assumptions

The FHA program has five major model assumptions, all of
which

can

be

questioned.

The

first

assumption,

just

discussed, is the method of converting variable interest rate
mortgages to a theoretical fixed rate mortgage for computing
allowable mortgage amounts.

FHA contends that the ten year

constant maturity rate is the market's best estimate of the
average interest rate over a ten year period using the one
year

constant maturity

rate

(Szymanoski

1990,

25) .

The

problem with this method is that the FHA receives no premium
for taking the interest rate risk.

If the average interest

rate

the borrower gets

is below the ten year rate,

benefit.

the

The FHA incurs the loss if the average rate is above

the ten year rate.

Consistent with the FHA1s reasoning from

financial theory, it should charge an additional premium for
the difference between the one year and the ten year rates.
The

second

assumption

is

increase by 4 percent per annum.
used by other programs.

that

property

values

will

This rate is less than that

For example, as explained in Section
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2*4*1,

Capital Holding assumed that property value would

increase by 1.3 percentage points higher than the Consumer
Price Index.

The FHA assumed rate of increase is lower than

Capital Holding's for increases in the Consumer Price Index in
excess of 2*7 percent*

Speare

(1992,

4) argues that the

elderly are likely to have different changes
values than the population at large.

in property

They are more likely to

live where property values are declining or where the rate of
appreciation is low.

Szymanoski (1990) stated that the FHA

did not find evidence to support this hypothesis*

Using data

from the national longitudinal sample of the Annual Housing
Surveys

from

1974

to

1983,

he

found

that

average

home

appreciation was .083 for all homeowners (cr=.017) and .076
(a=. 016) for the elderly.

He concluded that the two rates

were not significantly different (pp. 30-31).
Additionally, Speare argues that housing values will not
increase in the future at the same rate as in the last two
decades,

due to the

demographics

of the

"baby boomers*11

Speare is not the only person concerned with the future growth
of home values.

Mankiw and Weil (1988) concluded in their

econometric study that real housing prices will fall by 47
percent by the year 2007*
Holding

that

one

of

the

It was also pointed out by Capital
reasons

for

ending

its

reverse

mortgage program was a concern over the future growth rate of
home values.
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Speare further notes that even if FHA's estimate of
average housing appreciation is correct, the program may still
lose money due to the variance of the appreciation rate.
While FHA may incur a loss if a house appreciates less than 4
percent, it can receive no gain if a house appreciates more
than 4 percent.

He notes, for example, that Wyoming's average

appreciation rate from 1980 to 1990 was less than 0.5 percent
per year.
To

show the effects

of changes

in house prices and

variances, Speare computed the break-even annuity payment that
would be made under the current FHA model, the FHA model with
the standard deviation doubled, and the FHA model with the
house appreciation cut in half.

For purposes of computing the

standard deviation, he assumed that homes which deviate from
the mean appreciation will continue to do so.
percent

standard

deviation

and

a

random

progression of values on a particular house.
2

percent

standard

deviation

under

his

FHA uses a 10
walk

for

the

He found that a
method

provided

approximately the same monthly annuity as the FHA model.

He

found that annuity payments are extremely sensitive to both
the standard deviation and the average appreciation rate,
particularly at younger ages.
Although not pointed out by Speare, his data reveals that
payments were about twice as sensitive to a reduction in the
mean appreciation rate than to a proportional increase in the
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standard deviation of returns.

For example,

a 4 percent

standard deviation would reduce payments by approximately onequarter and a reduction in the average appreciation rate would
reduce payments by almost half.

At

age

80,

the higher

standard deviation would reduce payments by approximately oneseventh while the lower average appreciation rate would reduce
payments by approximately one-quarter.

Szymanoski (1990)

also points that the model is extremely sensitive to changes
in average property appreciation and somewhat less sensitive
to changes in its variance.
FHA decided to use the U.S. Decennial Life Tables for
1979 (female) to compute mortgage payments (Szymanoski 1990,
11) . Gender specific tables are outlawed by the Civil Rights
Act of 1968;

female tables were chosen as a conservative

measure (females have longer life expectancy than males) and
because they expected a large majority of female borrowers
(HUD 1990, p.5-2).

Speare (1992) showed that the model is

sensitive to mortality assumptions. Speare computed mortality
using

(1)

the

combined

rate

of

mortality

and

institutionalization observed for females in the Longitudinal
Study on Aging from 1984 to 1990 and (2) the lowest mortality
assumed in the Bureau of the Census projections of the U.S.
population for the year 2005, plus one-half of the rate of
entering institutions in the Longitudinal Study.

He found

that payments would be significantly reduced using either of
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the assumptions.

This is hardly surprising, Archer and Nye

(1987), discussed in Section 2.4.1, had similar conclusions.
Szymanoski (1990, 38-42) in developing the FHA plan addressed
two issues relating to the use of the life mortality table:
(1) adverse selection and (2) trends in future mortality.

He

argued that there is no evidence that the plan would be
effected

by

adverse

trends

in

mortality

will significantly benefit the poor elderly.

He

suggested

that the mortality

be

revised based

on the

selection

actual

or

that

future

assumptions may need to
data

from the

demonstration

project.
Since the

FHA reverse mortgage

becomes due if the

homeowner moves, the FHA model incorporates a move-out within
the mortality factor.

Szymanoski

(1990, 11-12) noted that

studies for the general population suggest that move-out rates
in relation to mortality decrease with age and range from 51*9
percent of mortality

for those between ages

percent of mortality for those over age 85.
takes

an

even more

conservative

position

65-69 to

47

The FHA model
by

assuming a

constant move-out rate of 30 percent of mortality for all age
groups, since those who take out a reverse mortgage are less
likely to move out than the general population.
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Thus, the

probability of program termination (T) at a given age (x) is
1*3 times the probability of death (q) at the given age;26
Tx = 1.3 qx.

(4)

Despite the apparently conservative assumption Speare (1992)
questions

whether

it

is

conservative

enough*

This

is

important because Szymanoski (1990, 54) found that "the model

26Combining the move-out rate into the mortality rate in
this manner tends to overstate the move-out rate; the amount
of the overstatement increases with age* This is the result
of the law of probabilities. Where q (dying) and m (moving)
are independent, but not mutually exclusive events, the
probability of q or m occurring can be stated as:
P
P + Pq m- P P .
^q+m = J-m
By substituting 1.3q for P(_+in (from the FHA model),
solving for Pm the following ^relationship is obtained:

(1)
' /
and

As the denominator of the above fraction decreases with age,
the probability of moving becomes a larger percentage of the
probability of dying*. The relationship at various ages is as
follows:
P /— P
Aqe
—m—*
-<
.304
*307
.311
.318
.331
*352
.383
.418

65
70
75
80
85
90
95
100
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is quite sensitive to changes in the move-out rate."

The

model can also be criticized for not adjusting move-out rates
for changes in home equity as was done by American Homestead
(see Section 2.4.1).
The FHA model makes no adjustment for joint ownership.
Instead, mortgage assumptions for joint ownership are based on
the

youngest

joint

owner.

assumption to attack.

This

is clearly

the

easiest

Szymanoski defends the assumption on

the bases that (1) the joint lives of owners with a wide age
disparity are close to the single life of the youngest owner;
(2)

no one can predict whether the death or move-out of a

joint owner will increase the likelihood of move-out by the
other

owner;

and

(3)

the

use

of

female

tables

conservative assumption that offsets this risk, in part.
primary

reason

convenience.

for

the

assumption

is

is

a

The

administrative

In a report to Congress (HUD 1990, p. 5-2), HUD

said that the use of joint mortality tables would increase the
complexity of the computations (which it admits is complicated
enough)

for a group that was expected to obtain only 25

percent of the mortgages.27
"Joint

borrowers with

To summarize HUD*s position:

similar

ages

do have higher

joint

mortalities, but correcting for this effect at this stage is
unlikely to substantially affect the actuarial soundness of

27The estimate was fairly accurate.
According to HUD
(1992, p. 2-7), approximately 29 percent of all loans are to
joint owners.
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the program and would introduce a kind of spurious precision
given the lack of program experience to guide the choice of
actuarial assumptions.11
4.2.2.4

Computation of the FHA HECM

The

backbone

of

the

FHA

model

is

the

concept

of

"principal limit" (See HUD 1989, pp. 6-1 to 6-4) . For a house
under the FHA limit, the principal limit is computed by taking
the present value of the house at the expected termination
date.

The discount rate is the expected interest rate plus

the monthly insurance rate.

It is also assumed that the house

will increase in value by 4 percent per year.
assuming

annual

rather

than

monthly

For example,

calculations,

if

a

homeowner with an expected termination date in ten years
obtains a 9.5 percent mortgage

on a $100,000 house,

principal limit is $57,070, computed in two steps.

the

First, the

expected value of the home on the termination date is the
future value of the house in ten years using a 4 percent
appreciation

rate?

this

is

$148,024.

The

$148,024

is

discounted to its present value at 10 percent (interest plus
insurance premium)

to arrive at $57,070.

Initial costs,

including the 2 percent up-front insurance premium, closing
costs,

and repair costs are subtracted from the principal

limit to arrive at the "net principal limit."

Assuming that

initial costs include $2,000 of insurance premiums and $2,000
of other costs, the net principal limit would be $53,070.
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The

net

principal

allowed.
limit

limit

becomes

the

maximum

line

of

credit

For a line of credit mortgage, the net principal

isincreased each

and insurance

period by the expected interest rate

premiums; if a line is not used, the amount of

the line of credit increases each period.
Computing the periodic payments
requires three steps*

for a term mortgage

First, the net principal limit of the

mortgage is determined in the same manner as for a line of
credit mortgage.

If there is a line of credit set-aside, the

amount of the set-aside is subtracted to arrive at the net
principal limit associated with the term mortgage (HUD 1989,
p. 6-8).

Next, the amount of the net principal limit at the

end of the

fixed term is determined using the following

formula;
FVk = PV0 (1 + i)k

where

(5)

FV is the future value;
PV is the present value;
k is the number of periods; and
i is the interest rate

(including

insurance

premium).
The second step is to compute the expected mortgage
balance (i.e., principal limit) at the end of the term.

The

third step involves taking the expected mortgage balance and
to compute the periodic payment using Equation 3 in Section
61

2.4 (above). A tenure loan is computed as a term loan to age
100 (HUD 1989, p. 6-6).
2.4.3

Accounting for the Insured HECM
Whereas the SEC has developed rules that make accounting

for

non-insured

HECMs

very

complex

(see

Section

2.3.1),

accounting for insured HECMs is very straight forward.

The

mortgagee will add any initial costs to the loan balance
financed for the borrower, plus any other payments made to the
borrower, and any interest, insurance premiums, or service
fees accrued.

Net earnings would equal the interest rate on

the mortgage balance plus any net service fee income.

Any

profits from origination are amortized over the loan term
(SFAS No. 91

1986, Para. 5).

SFAS No. 107 (1991) requires

disclosure of the fair market value of financial assets and
liabilities.
2*4.4

Taxation of the HECM

The taxation of the financial institution is fairly simple
as

well.

As

accrual

basis

taxpayers,

the

financial

institutions accrue tax on the interest (and net servicing
fee)

as

earned

(Reg.

accounting income.

Sec.

1.451-128), the

same

as

for

The same result would be expected for a

cash basis taxpayer under the original issue discount rules of

28Unless stated otherwise, regulations referenced in this
paper are Treasury Regulations found in volume 26 of the Code
of Federal Regulations (CFR).
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sections 1271 to 1275 of the Internal Revenue Code of
2Q
«
1986 * Regulation Section 1.451-1 would probably require
the financial institution to accrue income from origination
fees on closing the loan, because all events necessary to earn
the income are completed.30
The taxation to the homeowner is also straightforward,
but not as simple as for the financial institution.

The

homeowner does not include the annuity payments in income;
they are loans, not income.

As a cash basis taxpayer the

homeowner cannot deduct the accrued interest until it is paid
[see Reg. Sec. 1.461-1 (a) (1)].

If the homeowner moves out, it

is paid and the deduction is allowed on the first $100,000 of
loan

balance

[IRC

Sec.

163(h)(3)(C)(ii)].

Temporary

Regulation Section 1.163-11T appears to prorate total accrued
interest between the portion of the loan above and below the
$100,000
homeowner

threshold.
voluntarily

The

same

prepaid

rules would
the

mortgage.

apply

if the

Upon

the

homeowner's death, the homeowner's successor in interest gets
the deductions.

For purposes of this study, it is assumed the

home is sold by the estate and all other assets distributed

29In this paper, the Internal Revenue Code of 1986,
volume 26 of the U.S. Code is referred to as the "Code" or may
be
In references the Code is abbreviated as "IRC" in
accordance with convention.
30If the fees are non-refundable, using the same
regulation, the IRS could argue that the fees are taxable upon
receipt*
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immediately after the homeowner's death? without income to
offset, the deductions have no value.
If the homeowner sells the house,

gain is generally

recognized in the amount of the difference between the sales
price and its adjusted basis.

If the value of the house is

less than the mortgage, than the house is deemed sold for the
mortgage balance.

The homeowner may qualify for the Code

Section 121 $125,000 one time exclusion on the gain from the
sale of the house.

For purposes of this study, it is assumed

that the homeowner qualifies.
Since the annuity payments do not affect income, there
would be no secondary tax effects, such as taxation of Social
Security income or alternative minimum tax; however, the sale
of the house could have such an effect.
2.5

Split Interest
Under a split interest ("SI") plan, the homeowner sells

a remainder interest in the home, while retaining a life
estate.

The proceeds of the sale are generally taken as a

future series of annuity payments, although a lump-sum payment
is possible.

The annuity should either provide that the life

tenant pays the costs of home maintenance and receives a
larger annuity to pay for increased expenses or provide that
the

remainder

interest

pay

for

home

reducing the life tenant's fixed annuity.

maintenance,

while

"In either of these

arrangements the party who benefits from appreciation on the
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property stands the burden of rising expenses (Guttentag 1980,
86)."

Turner et al.

returns

are

deferred

(1982)

until

note that since investors'

death

and

since

returns

are

difficult to predict, private investors shy away from this
type

of plan.

For

financial

institutions,

uncertain

or

unfavorable accounting and tax implications can be added to
the list.
The remainder of this discussion is divided into the
following sections:
History of the SI plan;
Accounting for the SI plan;
Taxation of the SI plan; and
Other policy aspects of the SI plan.
2*5*1

History of the SI Plan
There has been no successful attempt to market a for

profit

SI

plan

(Scholen

1992,

271).

Some

charitable

organizations do have a form of SI, but it generally involves
a contribution of all or part of the remainder interest to the
charitable organization

(Scholen 1991,

37) .

Code Section

170(f)(3) allows a charitable deduction for contributions of
a remainder interest in a personal residence or farm.

In

general, contributions of remainder interests in most property
would

not

qualify

for

the

charitable

deduction.31

The

31Code Section 170(f) also permits a charitable deduction
for the transfer of a remainder interest that qualifies under
Code section 170(h) as a qualified conservation contribution
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charity generally provides an annuity (called a charitable
gift annuity) that will produce a charitable deduction of 40
to 60 percent (Taylor 1992, 361).

Taylor suggests that for

some high income taxpayers, the charitable gift annuity can
produce a higher annuity than some reverse mortgages,32

A

split purchase (a form of SI) has been touted as a tax shelter
(see Auster 1990; Auster 1993a; Auster 1993b), but is not
widely used.33
One of the first studies of an SI plan was conducted by
Chen (1973).

The study focused on a survey of Los Angeles

residents between the ages of 55 to 75.

The study was

designed

in

to

test

the

degree

of

interest

the

plan,

categories of persons interested in the plan, and categories
of persons not interested in the plan.

Only 9 percent (41 of

455) of the respondents expressed some interest in the plan;
seven respondents expressed great interest in the plan with
the remainder being somewhat interested.

Given the low level

or is the donor's entire interest in the property.
A
charitable contribution is also allowed for a remainder
interest in the charity if the' contribution is to a charitable
remainder annuity trust, charitable remainder unitrust, or a
pooled income fund (all specific trusts that must meet
specific Code requirements, intended to discourage tax
avoidance).
32The reason for this appears to be that the life estate
is generally discounted at a lower rate than the interest rate
used for uninsured reverse mortgages.
33The joint purchase tax shelter is not applicable to the
joint purchase of the life tenant's personal residence.
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of interest in the plan, Chen found five characteristics that
were more likely to occur in the group that expressed interest
in the plan than in the group that was not interested (some of
which are surprising).

The characteristics were:

(1)

having

an existing mortgage, (2) having inadequate income, (3) being
under age 65,

(4) being without family, and (5) having an

internal (rather than external) psychological profile.34
To increase the validity of the study, the respondents
were given the estimated income they would receive in exchange
for the remainder interest in the house.
plan had specific assumptions.

To do this, Chen's

In determining the value of

the remainder interest and annuity, a 5 percent interest rate
was used throughout.

It was assumed that land values would

increase by 5 percent each year, but the home itself would
depreciate 4 percent each year on a straight line basis (i.e.,
a 25 year life)*

The homeowner would receive a life annuity

with 10 years certain; married couples were given a joint life
annuity.
tables.

The annuity was computed using gender based annuity
The homeowner could withdraw from the transaction by

34Thus, a significant finding indicates that a given
characteristic is more prevalent amongst interested homeowners
than occurs in the public at large. The characteristics are
not predictive; interested persons composed less than 18
percent of those with each of the characteristics.
It also
does not necessarily indicate that the characteristic occurs
in a significant percentage of interested homeowners.
For
example, only 13 of 41 interested homeowners were without
families.
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repaying annuity payments plus

interest.35

Finally,

the

plan allowed a set aside, so that the remainderperson would
receive

only

part

of

the

property

on

the

homeowner's

death.36
In 1982 Buffalo instituted an SI plan, called the Home
Equity Living Plan ("HELP") .
(1)

HELP has a three fold purpose:

relieving financial burdens of the elderly, (2) improving

the housing stock, particularly in certain neighborhoods with
a

large

elderly

sustaining

population,

permanent

and

program*

(3)
As

is

creating

a

self-

clear

from

the

objectives, the HELP program is generally limited to lower
income

homeowners

in

inexpensive homes).

low

income

Under HELP,

neighborhoods

(i.e.,

a non-profit corporation

acquires the remainder interest in the elderly homeowner's and
in

exchange

rehabilitates
maintenance,

the

corporation

the house,
insurance

(2)

does
pays

and taxes,

the
all
and

following:
expenses
(3)

makes

(1)

of major
a

fixed

35This indicates that the homeowners did not fully
understand Chen1s proposal.
This provision makes the
transaction a "heads I win, tails you lose" situation for the
homeowner.
If conditions are favorable to the remainderman
(e.g., home value increase more than expected or the person
expects to die before reaching life expectancy), the homeowner
buys back the remainder at a favorable price. Otherwise, the
homeowner lets the remainderperson get the property.
36While this provision allows the homeowner to sell only
that portion of the house that is necessary for additional
income, it leads to the impractical result of the owner of the
remainder interest sharing an interest in the home with the
homeowner's heirs. This is not a desirable outcome for either
the remainderperson or the heirs.
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annuity payment to the homeowner.

After the homeowner dies,

the house can be resold to provide capital to fund another
homeowner (Garnett and Guttentag 1982).

Although payments

were initially limited to annuity payments, the current plan
allows for lump-sum payments or an exchange of payments for
essential services, such as for transportation or home nursing
(Scholen 1991).
The HELP model contains some interesting assumptions
which could be considered extremely generous.

First, in order

not to discourage some of those in most need of HELP,
formula was used for rehabilitation costs.

a

The modelers

conceded that the use of a formula could cause a problem of
adverse selection.

Second,

the model assumes that house

values will increase by 6 percent a year, a rate that is much
higher than most other models.

The exact methodology is

unclear,

remainder

but

it

appears

that

interests

are

discounted at 6 percent per year based on current value and
cash reserves are deemed to earn 12 percent per year (giving
a total return of 11.66 percent, including appreciation).

It

also appears that standard annuity tables were used, with
appropriate adjustment for joint lives (Garnett and Guttentag
1981).

With such liberal assumptions, one would not expect

the plan to be successful.

However, a Buffalo counselperson

advised in a telephone conversation on June 1, 1993 that the
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plan is quite successful.

It continues to fund 60 homes37

worth $1.9 million (up from $1.6 on inception).
clear

whether

the

program

counselperson believes.

is

as

It is not

successful

as

the

An increase in value of $0.3 million

over ten years represents an increase in value of 2 percent
per year, not 6 percent as expected.

It is possible that HELP

is dying a slow death.
2.5.2

Accounting for the SI Plan
In the SI plan, the financial institution purchases a

remainder interest (an asset) in exchange for an annuity (a
liability).

To

account

for

the

plan,

the

financial

institution separately accounts for the remainder interest and
the annuity.

There is no accounting authority advising how to

account for the remainder interest.

There are three possible

methods to account for the remainder interest and the costs
associated with holding the remainder interest:

(1)

costs of

holding the interest are expensed immediately (other than true
capital expenditures) and no revenue is recognized for the
reduced life estate of the homeowner; (2) costs of holding the
interest

(including annuity costs)

are capitalized and no

revenue is recognized for the reduced life estate of the
homeowner; and (3) costs of holding the interest are expensed
immediately

and

revenue

is recognized

over time

for the

37Garnett and Guttentag (1982) anticipated the program to
fund 80 homes.
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reduced life estate of the homeowner*

It appears that the

first option is closest to the GAAP model, even though the
model does not closely reflect the economics of the plan.
Income is recognized only on the sale of the property.
follows historical cost and is conservative.

This

It appears that

FAS 34 prohibits the capitalization of costs during the life
tenancy:

"The historical cost of acquiring an asset includes

the costs necessarily incurred to bring it to the condition
and

location

provided]."

necessary

for

For example,

its

intended

use

[emphasis

interest to hold land not under

development cannot be capitalized (FAS 34, Para. 11).
home

in an SI

necessary

for

is

already

its

intended

The

in theconditionand location
use.

The third

method

of

accounting, which leads to the best matching of revenue and
expense, does not appear to be supported by GAAP.
the

principles

transaction,

of

there

FAS

60

should apply to

is no evidence that the

Although

this

type of

statement is

intended to apply to all transactions requiring actuarial
computations.
Unlike

the

treatment

of

the

remainder

interest,

it

appears that FAS 60 should be followed for the treatment of
the liability to pay an annuity.

FAS 60 requires that the

cost of annuity payments be the difference between the present
value of the annuity at the beginning of the year and the
present

value

of

the

annuity
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at

the

end

of

the

year

(considering

the

annuitant's

new

life

expectancy).

Any

payments above that amount serve to reduce the liability
account.

Although FAS 60 is applicable only to insurance

companies, it is reasonable to assume that it would apply to
other businesses issuing insurance products.
2.5.3

Taxation of the SI Plan
Some tax aspects of the SI plan are not settled. It is

not clear whether the absence of clear rules is due to the
lack of interest by the public or whether the tax authorities
wish to make the consequences unclear to discourage Sis * The
reason for the uncertainty may not be clear, but the effect is
clear.

Uncertain tax consequences increase the risk of the

transaction.

To

compensate

for

the

increased

risk,

an

investor will require a higher return, which makes the plan
less attractive compared with other choices.
Although the taxation of an SI is not settled, a strong
argument can be made that a financial institution purchasing
a remainder interest is acquiring a capital asset (see IRC
Sec. 1221), the sale of which (or the entire home, after the
termination of the life estate)
gains tax.38
tax

rate

on

is subject to the capital

Although corporations are subject to the same
capital

gains

as

ordinary

income,

it

is

advantageous to classify the income as capital gains because
OQ
JOThe IRS could argue that the interests purchased
constitute inventory to the financial institution, and
therefore ineligible for capital gains treatment.
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it can offset capital losses from other sources.
may only deduct capital
gains.39

Corporations

losses to the extent of capital

The annual increases in value due to the depletion

of the life estate is not subject to taxation.
The homeowner cannot receive the $125,000 exclusion on
the sale of a residuary interest.

Revenue Ruling 84-43, 1984-

1 C.B. 24, held that Code section 121 only applies if the
elderly person disposes of his/her entire interest in the
property.

Thus, under current law, the SI is not appropriate

if the person has a large gain on the sale of the house. If
the payments were in the form of a mortgage, the installment
sale rule of Code section 453 could be used; however, since
the SI payment is in the form of an annuity, the tax would be
immediately payable.40

Unlike the reverse mortgage,

annuity payments are subject to tax.

the

The taxation of annuity

39Capital losses not deductible in the current year may
be carried back against net capital gains in the three
preceding taxable years and carried forward against net
capital gains in the succeeding 5 years (IRC
Sec. 1212).
Capital losses not deducted during this nine-year period are
disallowed.
4°Rev. Rul. 69-74, 1969-1 C.B. 43, would permit deferral
of the gain if this were a private annuity? a private annuity
must be an unsecured mere promise to pay. The rule is based
on the premise that this type of annuity cannot be fairly
valued [GCM 37371 (1977)]. For example, Estate of Llovd G.
Bell v. Commissioner. 60 T.C. 469 (1973), held that a secured
promise to pay would not permit deferral of the gain.
The
case also noted that some commentators have said that the
annuity must be issued by one who does not regularly issue
annuities.
It is unlikely that an annuity from a financial
institution, even if uninsured, would qualify for private
annuity status*
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payments is subject to the rules of Code section 72, which
bifurcate the annuity payments between income and return of
capital

based

bifurcation

on the

is

known

annuitant's
as

the

life

expectancy*

"exclusion

ratio."

This
Once

established, the income percentage remains constant until the
annuitant's

life expectancy

is reached;

entire annuity payment is taxed.
reaching

the

life

after which,

the

If the annuitant dies before

expectancy,

the

remaining

basis

is

deductible on the annuitant's final return as an itemized
deduction not subject to the two percent floor under Code
section 67(a) [IRC Sec. 67(b)(11)].
Senator Arlen Specter introduced S. 831 on March 16,
1983.

The bill provided that the sale of a remainder interest

in a personal residence would be eligible for the section 121
exclusion.

In addition,

the bill would have allowed the

purchaser of the remainder to treat the transaction as the
sale

of

the

depreciate

entire

the

interest,

property.

Attorney/Advisor,

Office

allowing

According
of

Tax

the

to

purchaser

Richard

Policy,

the

to

D'Avino,
Treasury

Department officially supported the expansion of section 121,
but was opposed to allowing the remainderperson a depreciation
deduction.
2*5.4

(U.S. Congress 1985, 73-79).
Other Policy Aspects of the SI Plan

The split interest plan has some beneficial features not
available

in a reverse mortgage.
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First,

by transferring

increased costs of maintenance, insurance and taxes to the
financial

institution,

the homeowner is protected against

inflation of these housing costs.
protected

against

unforseen

or

Second, the homeowner is
unusual

costs,

such

as

hurricane damage or the replacement of a roof (this is in
contrast to the reverse mortgage where the homeowner may be
forced to vacate the premises due to inability to pay for
these costs).

Finally,

an elderly homeowner may wish to

relieve the family from the responsibility of selling the
house after death.
An apparent problem with the SI plan is that annuities
received could constitute income for purposes of determining
eligibility for Supplemental Security Income.
American

Bar

Association

convinced

the

However, the

Social

Security

Administration not to count the annuity given by Arkansas HELP
(a plan modeled after Buffalo's HELP)

as income for that

purpose (ABA 1986, 14).
Sis

cannot

be

easily

securitized

investment that can be sold to the public.
be

securitized

components:
(liability).

by

splitting

the

into

a

passive

However, Sis can

transaction

into

two

the remainder interest (asset) and the annuity
Remainder

interests

can

be

bundled

into

portfolios operated as partnerships. The partnership units
would then be sold to non-profit organizations, pension plans,
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and

others41

interested

in

investing

in

single

family

housing.
2 •6

Sale-Leaseback
In a sale-leaseback ("SL"), the homeowner sells his/her

home to an investor, taking back a mortgage (or an annuity).
The investor then rents the house back to the homeowner under
a fixed long-term lease or for life.

The homeowner receives

mortgage or annuity payments from which he/she pays rent.
Although an SL can be structured as a net lease, where the
tenant pays all expenses of the property, its chief advantage
is that it can also be structured so that the tenant is not
responsible for maintenance.
against inflation.

This offers partial protection

Since SLs have been used principally as

tax shelters, it has been difficult to develop an SL plan that
is favorable to the homeowner and the investor while

meeting

IRS standards for a valid SL.
The remainder of this discussion is divided into the
following sections:
History of the sale-leaseback plan;
Accounting for the sale-leaseback;
Taxation of the sale-leaseback; and
Other policy aspects of the sale-leaseback.

41It would be of interest, for example, to corporations
with histories of capital losses exceeding capital gains.
Since the remainder interest has a built in capital gain, the,
income could be considered tax free.
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2.6.1

History of the Sale-Leaseback Plan
The SL plan has a short history with a limited number of

actual structured transactions.

The Fouratt Corporation, a

California real estate broker,

is generally credited with

developing the first SL plan not involving related parties in
1979*

Under the Fouratt Senior Equity Plan (also called the

Fouratt Plan), an investor purchased an elderly homeowner's
home at a discount from market value.

The discount, which

depended on the age of the homeowner, varied from 15 to 30
percent depending on the life expectancy of the homeowner (the
longer the life expectancy the higher the discount).
seller would provide

a small

down payment

(generally

The
10

percent) with the remainder in a 10- to 15-year mortgage.

The

buyer

the

also

homeowner

purchased
with

a

payments

deferred
once

annuity

the

to

mortgage

provide
was

repaid.

Independent appraisers determined a range of fair market rent
for the property and a rent in the lower end of the range was
generally used.

After three years the rent was increased by

40 percent of the homeowner's increase in retirement income
(e.g.,

Social

Security).

The

seller-lessee

paid

for

maintenance that did not exceed 10 percent of rent in a given
month. Buyers were responsible for the rest (Henry 1980).
Using data from the 1977 Annual Housing Survey, Jacobs
(1982) found that for all elderly homeowners 50 percent would
increase their income by at least $600 per year by using a
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reverse

mortgage.42

Twenty-three

percent

their income by at least $1,200 per year.
Plan,

would

increase

Using the Fouratt

a slightly smaller percentage would

increase their

income by at least $600 (49 percent). However, a much larger
percentage would increase their income by $1,200 (40 percent).
Surprisingly,

he

found that

the

Fouratt

Plan produced

a

greater effect for those under age 75 than those over age 75.
The San Francisco Development Fund instituted a home
equity conversion program in 1981. The fund acted as broker
between

the

institution.
and SLs.

homeowner

and

an

investor

or

financial

It offered reverse annuity mortgages (RAMs)43

While it arranged 118 RAMs from 1981 to 1985, only

8 SLs were arranged.

The SLs followed the Fouratt Plan (HUD

1985, 108).
Family-Backed Mortgage Association (FBMA), a for profit
mortgage company, offered an SL called the Golden Retirement
Annuity Mortgage or "Grannie Mae."

Under Grannie Mae, an

investor, generally a child of the homeowner, purchased the
home from the homeowner using a conventional mortgage (except
that the mortgage was subordinated to the seller's lease).

42The mortgage provided a sufficient annuity to reach 80
percent of initial home value at the end of the homeowner's
life expectancy.
In addition, a deferred annuity was
purchased to continue the payments to the homeowner and to pay
the mortgagee interest on the mortgage after that date. The
mortgage was not due until the homeowner died.
43The RAM program was discussed in Section 2.4.1 above.
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The proceeds

of the

loan and down payment were used to

purchase an annuity from an insurance company.

The seller

paid a fixed rent that included all maintenance, taxes and
insurance.

The plan was generally only applicable to family

arrangements because the plan required the seller to find the
purchaser and the latter would incur a negative cash flow
during the tenancy of the seller (HUD 1 985, 111).
2.6*2

Accounting for the Sale-Leaseback
For accounting purposes, besides the initial accounting

for the purchase of the building, the accounting rules for an
SL consist of two parts:

(1) accounting for the lease under

FAS 13 and (2) accounting for the annuity payments using FAS
60.

FAS 13 would require the lessor to treat the lease as an

operating lease, since the lease would meet none of paragraph
7's requirements of a capital lease by the lessee (see Para.
8) .

An operating lease is accounted for as a "true" lease

(e.g.,

rents

following

the

are

rents

general

and

the

rules

of

property

is

depreciating

insurance would not affect this result.

depreciated
property);

There is no provision

for the accrual of the increase in the guaranteed sales price.
FAS 60 requires that the cost of annuity payments be the
difference between the present value of the annuity at the
beginning of the year and the present value of the annuity at
the end of the year

(considering the annuitant's new life

expectancy); any payments above that amount act to reduce the
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liability account.

Although FAS 60 is applicable only to

insurance companies, it is reasonable to assume that it would
apply to other businesses issuing insurance products.
2*6.3

Taxation of Sale-Leasebacks
The tax treatment of the buyer-lessor of an SL

transaction is well defined.

The buyer obtains a cost basis

in the property under Code section 1012.
lease

would

be

calculated

after

Income from the

deducting

ordinary

necessary business expenses under Code section 162.
generally the same as for financial reporting
depreciation).

annuity

This is

(except for

Depreciation of the building is based on a

27.5 year life under Code section 168(c)(1).
the

and

contract

is

similar

to

The taxation of

that

for

financial

reporting (see IRC Sec. 807) .
The IRS has taken the position that an SL transaction
will be respected if it meets the following tests:
(1)

The home is sold at fair market value (discounts
are deemed to be prepaid rent)?

(2) The lease provides a fair market value rent;
(3) The title to the property is transferred to

the

purchaser?
(4) The lease is not a lifetime lease (see below);
(5) The transaction is entered into for profit;
(6)

The seller does not have an option to repurchase
the property below-market value; and
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(7)

The

purchaser

has

all

the

responsibilities

of

ownership (taxes, maintenance, and insurance) and
receives

all

appreciation

in the building

(HUD

1985, 71-72)*
The first issue for the seller-lessee is the availability
of Code section 121, which exempts the first $125,000 of gain
from principal residences.

The IRS has suggested that if the

leaseback is for the life of the seller-lessee,

then the

transaction would likely be recharacterized as a sale of a
remainder interest (U.S. Congress 1985), which is not eligible
for the Code section 121 exclusion.44

If the transaction is

treated as an SL for tax purposes, any gain over the exclusion
would be subject to tax.

As with the SI, if the payments are

in the form of a mortgage, the installment sale rules of Code
section 453 can be used; however, if the payment is in the
form of an annuity, the tax would be immediately payable.

The

taxation of annuity payments was discussed under taxation of
split interests (Section 2.5.3).

The taxation of the annuity

is less favorable than for an SI. In an SI, only part of the
property is exchanged for an annuity;

in an SL the entire

44It is not clear whether the use of a fixed term lease
that extends beyond a homeowner's life expectancy would be
treated in the same manner. However, if a term lease is for
30 years or more, the IRS would likely take the position that
the lease is a retained interest in the property [see Reg.
Sec. 1.1031 (a) -1 (c) ] .
As a result, the Code section 121
exclusion would be denied, but the transaction would be
treated as an SL for tax purposes.
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property is exchanged for an annuity, which is offset directly
by non-deductible rent.

This makes the SL the least favorable

plan for the homeowner from a tax standpoint.
On October 3, 1983, Senator Arlen Specter introduced S.
1914, which focused on the tax aspects of SLs used for home
equity conversions.

The Fouratt Plan did not meet the IRS's

requirements for a bona fide SL arrangement? therefore, the
tax consequences were not clear.

S. 1914 provided safe harbor

rules and leases that met the safe harbor rules would be
considered sales at fair market value followed by true leases.
For example, the homeowner would be eligible for the section
121 exclusion and the buyer would not be required to include
the market discount as prepaid rent.
would

exempt

the

transaction

from

In addition, the bill
the

"anti-churning"

provisions of the ACRS depreciation rules, allowing the buyer
to use the favorable ACRS depreciation rates.45

The safe

harbor tests were consistent with the terms of the Fouratt
Plan.

Except for the provisions relating to Code section

121,46 the Treasury was opposed to S. 1914

(U.S. Congress

1985, 78-79).

45The "anti-churning provisions are no longer applicable
to residential rental property [IRC Sec. 168(f)(5)(B)].
46The brief statement by the Treasury clearly indicated
that the department was not opposed to granting a Code section
121 exclusion where the homeowner sold the property and
received back a lifetime lease. It was not clear whether the
Treasury also agreed to treat the lease as a true lease to the
buyer-lessor.
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An

amended version

of

S . 1914

was

included

in the

Senate's version of the Deficit Reduction Bill of 1984.
bill

provided

that

the

provision

would

not

The

apply

to

transactions between related individuals47 and tax shelters.
The bill would also have required that the sales price of the
residence be fair market value (which is inconsistent with the
Fouratt Plan) . Finally the purchaser would have to use a 40year

depreciable

life,

which

was

far

longer

depreciable lives available under the tax law.

than

the

In short, the

Senate, while accepting its general provisions, destroyed S.
1914 in the details.

The provision was later eliminated from

the final bill in conference (U.S. Congress 1985, 79) .
For purposes of this research it is assumed that the
transactions qualify as true SLs and are not taxed as Sis.
2*6.4

Other Policy Aspects of the Sale-Leaseback
The SL is similar in many respects to the SI.

It can

provide the elderly seller-lessee with inflation protection by
means of a fixed rent, relief against unexpected costs, and
freedom from property management.

It also avoids estate

problems relating to the home, since the property has been
sold.

Like the SI, the transaction cannot be securitized but

can be split between the asset (the leased property) and the

47A SL is often used in intra-family tax planning. For
example Murphy (1992) found that from a family perspective, an
intra-family SL with financially capable heirs would be
preferable to using a reverse mortgage.
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liability (the annuity).

Finally, like the SI, the annuity

may be considered income for determining eligibility for SSI *
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CHAPTER ITT
METHODOLOGY
The methodology employed in this research uses Monte
Carlo simulation with an after-tax discounted cash flow model.
In the model, an elderly homeowner purchases a home for cash
and

immediately

thereafter

enters

into

a

home

equity

conversion ("HEC") plan. This avoids questions relating to the
taxation of built-in gains at the commencement of the HEC,
which would be different for each taxpayer.
and Nye

(1987)

and Tate

Similar to Archer

(1987) , the home value is set at

$100,000, which is assumed to be below the FHA limit.

Other

than actuarial assumptions, all model parameters are fixed?
however, separate computations are provided for alternative
tax rates and homeowner's ages.

At the end of the homeowner's

tenure (move-out or death) , the property is sold at 90 percent
of fair market value (transaction costs on sale are set at 10
percent of market value).48

The present value of housing

costs and the return to the financial institution and the
insurer (FHA) are then computed.

Four plans are considered.

The first is a standard FHA tenure HECM.

The remaining three

48The FHA assumption that the house is sold at fair
market value is retained as the base case when testing the
sensitivity of the FHA model to its assumptions.

plans are designed to achieve, as closely as possible, the
same basic pre-tax economics: a growth HECM, a split interest
plan ("SI") , and a sale-leaseback ("SL"). These alternatives
to the HECM are used to assess the economic and financial
consequences to the homeowner,

the financial institution, and

the FHA relating to the homeowner's selection of a financing
plan.
A single net present value

("NPV") model

is used to

assess the economic consequences to all subjects, i, in the
financing plan ( the homeowner, the financial institution, and
the FHA):
NPVi = f

The

[Entity (ENT), Plan (PLAN), Initial Age (IA),
Actuarial Assumptions (ACT), Death Year (DY),
Move-out Year (MY), Interest Rate (INT), FHA
Insurance Rate (FHA), Initial Home Value
(IHV), Closing Costs (CC), Home Appreciation
Rate (HAR), Inflation Rate (INF), Discount
Rate (DR), Property Operating Costs (POC),
Plan Servicing Costs (SC), Tax Rate (TRATE),
Accounting Rules (AR), Tax Rules (TR)].

remainder

of

the

chapter

is

divided

following parts:
Overview of the methodology;
Descriptions of HEC plans;
Model variables and assumptions; and
Model tests and hypotheses.

86

into

the

3.1

Overview of the Methodology
This research is conducted in four steps.
Step 1.

Cumulative mortality tables are constructed
from the government life tables at age 65. In
keeping with the FHA model assumptions,
cumulative move-out rates are computed at 30%
of mortality.
This process is repeated for
ages 70, 75, 80, and 85.

Step 2.

Monte Carlo simulation determines the relative
life expectancy and move-out potential for one
thousand individuals.
Both life expectancy
and
move-out
expectations
are
uniform
distributions with possible values between
zero and one and are independent of each
other.

Step 3.

The relative life and move-out expectancies of
each individual (Step 2) are converted to a
fixed age using the tables produced by Step 1.
The fixed death and move-out ages become the
input data for Step 4. This step is repeated
for each base age assumption.

Step 4.

The economic consequences to each entity are
computed for each simulation using the data
from Step 3.
Separate simulations are
required for each plan,
base age,
and
appreciation rate.
An expected cash flow is
found by adding each period's cash flow for
each simulation and dividing by the number of
simulations.

For example,
mortgage*

a homeowner at age

65 obtains an HECM

The homeowner dies at age 70 and the move-out date

is age 75 (where the homeowner dies on or before the move-out
date,only the date of death

is significant) . Thecomputation

of cash flows is calculated as follows:
(1)

At age 65, the homeowner has a negative cash flow
of $100,000 for the house.In addition,
the
homeowner incurs $2,000 in
closing costs and
mortgage insurance, respectively.
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(2) From age 66 to 70, the homeowner receives an HECM
payment (net of mortgage administration costs) from
which house operating costs are subtracted.
(3) At age 70, the house is sold at 90% of fair market
value, and the homeowner receives a payment equal
to the sales price net of the outstanding mortgage
balance (but not below zero).
(4)

Because the homeowner dies without selling the
home, there are no tax effects (since estate taxes
are ignored) . If the homeowner had moved out at
age 70 and died at age 75, the homeowner would be
entitled to a deduction for the current real estate
taxes and all
interest
(including interest,
administration
fees,
and mortgage
insurance)
incurred for the life of the mortgage, subject to
limitations. The homeowner would also have to pay
tax on any gain on the sale over $125,000.

(5)

The NPV of the cash flows of the homeowner is
computed assuming no tax, 15% tax, and 28% tax.
This information is retained for further analysis.
The cash flow for each year is computed in a
separate
account
to be aggregated
for all
homeowners.

(6)

Steps 1 to 5 above are repeated for each homeowner
in the simulation.

(7)

After all homeowners1 yearly cash flow is computed,
the grand totals are averaged by the number of
homeowners (1,000).
This results in an expected
cash flow for each year.
The expected cash flow
can be discounted by the appropriate discount rate
to get an NPV of the flows, with and without tax.

3.2

Descriptions of the HEC Plans
As previously stated, this research compares the FHA HECM

with three alternative plans that are not presently available:
a growth HECM mortgage, an SI? and an SL.

Each of the three

alternative plans is designed to provide the homeowner with
inflation protection, which is not available in the current
FHA plan.
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3.2.1.

FHA Home Equity Conversion Mortgage

The FHA HECM plan is a tenure plan assuming the maximum
allowed annuity payments.

Interest is computed using an

interest rate of 8 percent, before FHA mortgage costs.

In

addition to the FHA insurance of 2 percent of value, costs of
2 percent of value are deducted

from the principal

sum.

Although the FHA permits the financial institution to transfer
the loan to the FHA once the loan reaches 98 percent of the
maximum claim amount ($98,000 for homes in this study), the
mortgages are assumed to be held to maturity.
3.2.2

Growth Home Equity Conversion Mortgage
The growth HECM uses the same assumptions as the FHA

plan, but instead of the HECM annuity payments, payments in
the growth HECM remain constant throughout the year,

but

increase 4 percent a year for the entire term of the mortgage.
By providing inflation protection, this graduated plan is more
similar to the SL and SI plans than the flat payment plan*
The initial payment for the growth HECM is computed using
the future value of a growth annuity of $1 (11FVGA") :
(1 + im)n _ ±

FVGAkifftQ = (1 +

where k is the nominal interest rate,
g is the growth rate, and
i* = (l + k)/(l + g) .
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(6 )

The FVGA can be derived be adding growth to the future value
of an annuity of $1 ("FVA") formula*49

49The annuity in a standard HECM is computed using the
future value of annuity formula (FVA):

(1 )

FVAkta = £ Cl+Jc)^1,
t=i
which can be expressed as:
FVAk

+ (1 +k)n~1

= (1 +k)0 + (1+k)1

(2 )

If growth value, g, is incorporated into Equation 2, the
future value of the annuity is:
FVGAk,g,n

+ (1+k)15-1 (1 +g)

(l+k)° (l+g)n +

(4)

(1 +g)a [<l+*)° (l+gr)]
Equation 4 can be rearranged as
11+kV-1
\l+91

FVGAk, n, g = (i +g)n7 1 +k \° + 11 +k \1
\l+gj
\l+gj
By letting 1 + i* equal
becomes:
FVGAr

(5)

(1 + k)/ (1 + g) , the formula

( l + g ) D[(l+i*)° + (1 +i*)1 + . . , + (1 + i*)n_r

(6 )

Equation 6 can be expressed in terms of the FVA formula
as:
FVGAk.g.n

(7)

(l +g)n •FVAr

The FVA portion of Equation 7 can be expressed in a
standard mathematical equivalence to yield:
(1 +i*5

90

-1

(8 )

If the future value is known, the theoretical payment at
time zero can be obtained by dividing the future value
by the FVGA factor.

The first payment is equal to the payment

at time zero times one, plus the growth rate.
For purposes of this study, it is assumed that the growth
mortgage

balance will

be

equal

to the

standard mortgage

balance at its theoretical termination at age 100.

Therefore,

the annual payments for the growth mortgage are computed by
applying the FVGA formula to the mortgage balance of the
standard mortgage at age 100.
3-2.3.

Split Interest

Under the SI plan, the financial institution purchases a
remainder interest for the present value of the property
(based on the individual1s age) based on a discount rate of
8.5 percent (which includes the insurance premium)■

Closing

costs, paid by the homeowner, are $4,000 ($2,000 of which are
paid to the insurance company).

The net payment is used to

purchase an annual life annuity computed at an 8 percent
interest

rate.

The homeowner pays

the current property

operating costs? the financial institution pays any increases
in operating costs.

The FHA provides insurance for the same

amount as the standard FHA HECM and insurance premiums are the
same.

If the homeowner moves out of the house, the value of

the remainder interest in the home (assuming no appreciation)
is converted to a life annuity at an 8 percent rate, but based
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on the life expectancy of the homeowner at the time of the
move-out.
3*2.4.

Sale-Leaseback

Under the SL plan, the homeowner sells the property to
the financial institution for $100,000, less the FHA insurance
fees and closing costs*

The homeowner pays rent equal to the

deemed interest cost of 8*5 percent (which includes insurance
costs) of $100,000 plus estimated operating costs at current
prices.

In addition, the homeowner receives a life annuity

with a value of $96,000,
percent*

based on an interest rate of 8

Insurance coverage is initially equal to the value

of the home, increasing by 4 percent per year and costs 0.5
percent of coverage.
3 *3

Variables and Assumptions of the Model
The research uses an ex post net present value of cash

flows for each subject to measure the relative attractiveness
of each plan to each entity.50

Net present value of cash

flows for a particular subject is defined as follows:
no
NPVCFent =

CFi (l*y)m ~i

(7)

i-IA
where

CF is the cash flow;

50Since each of the plans has features not measured by
this research, it is possible that a plan with a low cash flow
can have a high utility. For example, if it is important to
relieve the heirs of the duty to sell the home, the homeowner
may wish to use an SI or SL plan, even if the net present
value of cash flows were less favorable than a mortgage plan.
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IA is the initial age of subject; and
y is the discount (interest) rate*
Financial institutions are not only interested in cash
flow, but also in accounting income*

The timing of cash flows

and accounting income can often differ, although over the life
of the loan, the two will have the same cumulative totals.
This research uses the net present value of accounting flows
to measure the timing benefits of accounting income.

The

present value of accounting income (NPVAI) is computed using
the same formula as NPVCF, except that accounting income (AI)
is used instead of cash flow (CF).
The surrogate for measuring the ex ante attractiveness of
a particular plan is the expected value of the net present
value of cash flow:

E E CF^U+y^-i
n

EiNPVCF)Em
where
As

=

110

—

----------------- ---- ---------------------------------------------

n is the number of loans.

withthe NPVAI,

the E (NPVAI)

is the

same formula

as

E(NPVCF), except that accounting income is substituted for
cash flow.
A

secondary measure

of

attractiveness

for

financial

institutions is the internal rate of return of expected cash
flows ("IRR").

The IRR is the discount rate (y) required to

produce an E(NPVCF) of zero.

The IRR of accounting income is
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not used because it leads to an undefined result for mortgage
plans.
3 *4

Model Variables and Assumptions
The variables

used

in the model

are

listed in

generalized model at the beginning of this chapter.
variables

Entity

previously.

(ENT)

and

Plan

(PLAN)

were

the
The

discussed

The remainder of the variables will be discussed

in this section*
3*4*1

Initial Age
The initial age (IA) is the subject's age at the start of

the plan.

All subjects are deemed to start the plan at the

following alternative ages:
3.4.2

65, 70, 75, 80, and 85.

Actuarial Assumptions
This research follows the FHA model which uses the female

mortality tables in the U.S. Decennial Life Tables for 19798151

(U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 1985),

for all computations, except the taxation of

annuities. The

mortality tables stop at age 110; therefore, it is assumed
that no one survives beyond age 110.

The taxation of annuity

income is based on the annuity tables in the regulations under
Code section 72*
In keeping with the intent of the FHA model, a move-out
rate of 30 percent of the mortality rate in the Life Tables is
used.

The probability of moving out, conditioned on survival,

51These tables are called Life Tables in this paper.
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is assumed to be

independent of mortality.

As discussed in

Section 4.2.2.3, the methodology used in the FHA model (which
increases mortality each year by 30 percent to cover loveouts) is inconsistent with its desired aim.
From

the

significant

in

life

tables,

this

the

research:

following
life

variables

expectancy

are
(LE),

probability of dying (dx) , and probability of moving out (dm) .
Life expectancy is reported in the life tables and in the
section 72 regulations.

Life expectancy as reported in the

life tables is used to compute the accounting and taxable
incomes for the financial institution.

The section 72 life

expectancy (which is higher than the life tables) is used to
compute the homeowner's taxable annuity income under the SI or
SL plans.
The probability of dying is the cumulative probability of
dying before a particular age and is used to compute the
subject's age at death.

The formula for the probability of

dying at a given age is;
nli
inlIA

dXi = —

where

(9)

nl is cumulative number living and
i is the age in question.

The probability of moving is the cumulative probability
that the subject will move by a certain date, conditioned on
survival, and is used to compute the subject's age at move95

out.

The formula for the probability of moving out at a given

age is:
dmi = .3 dxi.
3*4.3

(10)

Death Year
Death year (DY) is the age each subject dies.

Using the

computer's random number generator, each subject is randomly
given a number (D) between 0 and 1 representing the value of
dx at the time of the subject'sdeath.
discussed in the precedingsection,

Usingthe life

DY equals the

tables

age of the

subject at time D, rounded to the nearest whole year.
3.4.4

Move-out Year
Like Death year, move-out year

(MY)

subject would move out if still living.
random number generator,

is the age each

Using the computer's

each subject is randomly given a

number (M) between 0 and 1 representing the value of dm at the
time the subject moved. MY is the age of the subject at time
M, rounded to the nearest whole year.
a maximum M of 0.3 at age 110.

The Life Tables produce

If M is greater than 0.3, then

MY is assigned a value of 111.

MY is only significant if it

is less than DY; a move-out on or after a subject's death has
no meaning.
3.4.5

Interest Rate
The fixed interest rate of 8

(8.5 if insurance is

included) percent per annum compounded monthly is used.
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A

variable rate52 was deemed inappropriate because it could
confound the results of the research.
a subject of this study.
could

raise

Interest rates are not

The addition of a variable rate

doubts whether

the

results were

due

to

the

respective HEC plans and their tax consequences or due to the
effect of changing interest rates.
3*4.6

FHA Insurance Rate
The FHA insurance rate (FHA) for either the standard HECM

or the growth HECM is the same as the one fixed by the FHA.
The rate is 2 percent of the house value at closing plus an
annual

rate

of

0.5

percent

outstanding mortgage balance.

compounded

monthly

on

the

The insurance rate for the SI

is computed as if an HECM mortgage were granted at the closing
instead of an SI.

The SL's insurance rate is 2 percent on

closing and 0.5 percent per annum compounded monthly on the
insured amount (which is the initial home value increased by
4 percent per annum).
3*4.7

Closing Costs
Closing costs (CC) are fixed at $2,000 (2 percent of the

house value) . Although this is at the lower end of costs (see
HUD 1992)

currently charged,

it is higher than what other

research has assumed (see Speare 1992)*
considered

the

actual

costs

The closing costs are

incurred

by

the

financial

52As explained in chapter 2, virtually all FHA HECMs are
variable rate mortgages.
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institution.

Therefore,

there

is no need to

separately

account for these costs for either accounting or taxable
income purposes.
3.4.8

Home Appreciation Rate
The home appreciation rate (HAR) is treated as a variable

in this research.

In keeping with other studies (see Scholen

1992) , three alternative rates are used:

0 percent, 4 percent

(the FHA model assumption) and 8 percent per annum.

In each

case the mean appreciation rate for each home is constant.
One purpose of this research is to learn the effect of the HAR
on HEC plan choice.
3.4.9

Inflation Rate
For simplicity, the inflation rate

(INF)

is set at a

constant 4 percent per annum, the same as the FHA model's
estimate of HAR.
3*4.10

Discount Rate

The discount rate (DR) is used for computing net present
value of cash flows and accounting income.

The rate used is

8 percent per annum compounded monthly, the same as INT.
short,

is

assumed

that

the

homeowner,

the

In

financial

institution and the FHA could invest excess funds in 8 percent
mortgages.

Since the discount rate is based on the purchase

of mortgages, the income from which is taxable, the discount
rate is deemed to be a pre-tax rate.
adjusted for taxes, thus
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The discount rate is

d r trate

3.4.11

= £iVT (1 - TRATE) ,

Property Operating

It is

(11)

Costs

assumed that initial operating costs are 3.5

percent of property value,

consisting of 1.8 percent for

property tax, 1.5 percent for repairs, and 0.2 percent for
insurance

(see Ali et al. 1990) .

Costs are adjusted for

changes in the value of the home. Repairs are adjusted for
changes in inflation,

if higher than the home appreciation

rate.
3*4*12

Plan Servicing Costs

Plan servicing costs are twenty-five dollars per month.
After adjusting for the interest rate effect and rounding to
the nearest dollar, the annual charge is 312 dollars.

The

charge is within the range generally charged by financial
institutions (HUD 1992, p. 3-13).

Twenty-five dollars is also

used by other researchers (see Scholen 1992 and Speare 1992).
The servicing costs are deemed to cover the costs of servicing
the plan, with no profit*
3.4.13

Tax Rate

The tax rates (TRATEs) on December 31, 1992 are used.
For individuals, rates of 15 and 28 percent are used.

There

was also a 31 percent rate, but it is not considered because
(1) it is unlikely that an upper income individual would be
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interested in home equity conversion53 and

(2)

it is not

materially different from the 28 percent rate. A 34 percent
rate is used for financial institutions (it is assumed that
any financial institution interested in home equity conversion
would be subject to the 34 percent rate).
As part of the president's budget package, tax rates were
increased effective January 1, 1993*

The new 36 percent tax

rate on individuals only affects individuals with taxable
income above $115,000 and the 39.6 percent rate applies to
persons

with

individuals

taxable

income

over

$250,000?

upper

income

are unlikely to want home equity conversion.

Corporations with incomes above $10 million will have a tax
rate of 35 percent.54

The higher rate is not used in this

study because (1) not all financial institutions will have the
threshold income and (2) the difference between 34 and 35
percent is not material.
3.4.14

Accounting Rules

Accounting

rules

financial institution.

(AR)

are

only

applicable

to

the

Except for the depreciation rate on

53The median income of FHA HECM borrowers is less than
$7,600 of which the median Social Security income is $7,000.
More than a quarter of borrowers had income of less than
$3,200, while less than 10 percent had income in excess of
$15,000.
(HUD 1992, p. 2-6).
54Personal service corporations are subject to the 36
percent tax rate on all income.
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the building (which will be discussed in the next section),
the rules are discussed in Chapter 2.
3-4.14
Tax

Tax Rules
rules

financial

no

are

institutions.

Chapter 2.
has

(TR)

applicable

to homeowners

The tax rules

and to

are discussed

in

As a practical matter, the financial institution

book-tax

differences,

except

that

for

the

SL,

depreciation for accounting purposes assumes a useful life of
50 years, while for tax purposes a useful life of 27.5 years
is used.

Since

it is impossible to know the exact tax

position of each homeowner or financial institution, secondary
effects that depend on facts not included in the study are
ignored.

For example, the effect of added income on the

taxation of Social Security benefits is ignored*

Also, it is

assumed that the taxpayers are not subject to the alternative
minimum tax (AMT).
3.4.15

Annua11zat1on

For convenience, all computations in this research are
done on an annual basis.

Each subject is deemed to move out

or die on either the first or last day of each year.

If the

subject moves out or dies during the last half of the year,
then the subject is deemed to die at the end of the year.
Death or move-out within the first half of the year is deemed
to occur at the beginning of the year.
charges often occur monthly.

Interest or other

All rates are converted from
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nominal monthly compounding (Y^) to effective annual rates
(Ye) using the following formula:

r, = (i + 3 f )12-

(12>

For example, using the above formula, an 8.3 percent effective
annual rate is used for all computations assuming 8 percent
monthly compounding.
3.4•16

Computation of Annuities

Annuities to the homeowner are computed from the above
assumptions.

For the HECM, the monthly payment is determined

using a computer program furnished by the FHA to FHA lenders.
This method is necessary because the FHA uses a different
method for computing the expected life of the loan than is
used in this research (see Section 3.4.2).

The payment is

annualized using the future value of an annuity formula in the
footnote to Section 3.2.2 (i.e, the future value of an annuity
of 12 periods using a nominal interest rate of 8 percent).
The interest rates used to determine the initial payment of
the growth mortgage (see section 3.2.2 ) are also adjusted for
annualization.
Since the annuities in the SI and the SL are paid for
life, even if the homeowner moves, the annuities are valued
based on the formula for the present value of an annuity of
$1.00 per period (PVA$1) over the homeowner's life expectancy
(LE) :
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1

rp

——

PVA$lk LE - V ---------=
K. (1+*)“

—

——

——

(l+Jc)^

(13)

k

If the present value of the annuity (PVA) is known, such as
when property is exchanged for an annuity, the annuity payment
(AP) is computed as:
PVAk TW
APk TF = ---------.
PVA$ lk_LE

If AP is known but PVA is unknown,

, v
(14)

such as the financial

institution's annual valuation of the annuity for accounting
and tax purposes, the PVA can be found with the following
formula:
PV*k.LB =

The tax rules use

*APktLB-

(I5 )

a longer lifeexpectancy (LETT) than

the life expectancy (LE) used to calculate the value of the
annuities*

For tax purposes, the exclusion ratio, ER, (the

untaxed portion of each payment)

is determined using the

following formula:
AP *LEr
ER--¥vir•

, .
(16)

The untaxed amount of each payment is obtained by multiplying
the amount of the payment (AP) by the exclusion ratio (ER).
The remaining amount of the payment is subject to tax*
taxation of annuity payments is discussed in chapter 2.
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The

3.5

Model Tests and Hypotheses
The analysis portion of the research is divided into

three parts.

The first part consists of a comparison of the

four HEC plans for the homeowner, the financial institution,
and the insurer

(FHA) using different age, tax, and house

appreciation rate assumptions.

The second portion tests to

find if any of the plans are inconsistent with the tax policy
assumptions discussed in chapter 2 *

The last part of the

analysis is to examine the sensitivity of some of the FHA
model1s assumptions.
3.5.1

Plan Comparison
As previously stated, the net present value of expected

returns is the primary measure used to compare the plans.
Both the expected value and the standard deviation of the
value are computed for each scenario.
find

if

the

expected

significantly different

values

A z test is used to

between

two

plans

(see Iman and Conover,

283).

are
For

financial institutions, a similar examination is made for the
internal rate of return of expected cash flows ("IRR").
Individuals

are

in

a

different

financial institution and the FHA.

situation
First,

from

at least

the
some

individuals may consider using the home equity conversion as
an investment.

Therefore,

for individuals, the additional

choice of doing nothing is analyzed.

Secondly,

individuals

cannot obtain a portfolio of HECs? consequently, the expected
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value has little significance.

For this reason, a test of

ranks is also used.
For each subject in each scenario, the actual net present
value is computed for each HEC plan (including doing nothing) .
The net present value of each plan is ranked, so that each
plan has a value between 1 (best) and 5 (worst)? ties were
averaged

(there are ties between two plans,

but no ties

between three or more plans)* The ranks are analyzed in three
ways.

The first is an overall test of expected ranks (instead

of expected NPV).

The second are two overall mini-max tests

to determine the number of times a plan is the best (or best
two) or the worst (or worst two), with 0.5 points awarded for
ties.

The computer program that analyzes ranks also collects

data for a head to head test between each plan, with ties
being ignored.
For testing purposes,

the test of expected ranks

is

analyzed using the same methodology described in the first
paragraph of this section.
distribution.

The other tests use a binomial

For test two, a significant (p =.05) likelihood

of having at least a 50 percent chance of being in the best or
worst categories is deemed significant.

The likelihood of not

being in the best or worst categories is also tested.
head to head data is tested only for doing nothing,
comparison

between

the

other
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plans

is

not

The
since

particularly

interesting*

The head-to-head test assumes an expected rate

of 50 percent.
3.5.2

Tax Policy Assumptions
As stated in section 2*3.2, there are two tax policy

issues relating to home equity conversion that are tested in
this research.

The first issue is vertical equity.

Vertical

equity seeks to have taxpayers with more income pay more tax
than persons with less income.

A vertical equity problem is

indicated if a person makes an investment decision such that
the decision is different given different tax rates.

A tax

exempt bond is an example of a vertical equity violation.
Persons in high tax brackets find the bonds more profitable
than competing investments, while lower taxed persons do not.
Therefore,

in

this

research,

a

change

in

an

investment

decision based on changes in the tax rate is treated as a
surrogate

for

principle.55

a

violation

of

the

vertical

equity

This idea can be expressed in the following

research hypothesis:
Hr

Ceteris paribus, if choice A has a greater expected
NPV than choice B before tax then choice A has an
equal or greater expected NPV than choice B after
taxes, using a tax adjusted discount rate.

55As hinted by the example of tax exempt bonds, the tax
law has many violations of the vertical equity principle.
However, from a policy standpoint, it is necessary that
Congress be aware of the violations.
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In its broadest sense, a tax subsidy exists where the tax
law provides

a benefit

for a particular transaction not

available for other transactions.

Therefore, in this sense,

the vertical equity issue and the tax subsidy are the same.
However,

"tax

definition*

subsidy"

is

often

given

a

more

narrow

Under this definition, and the definition used in

this research, a person receives a tax subsidy if the expected
return after tax is greater than the expected return before
tax.

Some tax shelters before

subsidies.

1986 were set up as tax

The out of pocket costs of the tax shelters were

more than offset by current tax savings from the investments.
Although taxes would ultimately be due, the gain would be
taxed at a lower rate than the initial deductions and gain
would not be taxed for several years, reducing the present
value of the tax due.

This definition leads to the following

research hypothesis for a tax subsidy:
Hr

Ceteris paribus, the before-tax NPV from choice A
is less than the after-tax NPV of choice A after
tax,

where

the

after-tax

discount

rate

is

not

adjusted for the tax rate.
3.5*3

Sensitivity of FHA Assumptions
Although

the

assumptions

of

the

FHA

model

appear

consistent with the assumptions used by other organizations in
establishing

their

plans

(see
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Chapter

2

for

the

model

assumptions of other plans), the FHA plan has been criticized
for having assumptions that are too liberal.
Toward a better understanding of the risks inherent in
the FHA1s plan, this research explores the sensitivity of the
assumptions in the FHA model.

The base model employs the same

model as used for evaluating the profitability of the FHA plan
as discussed in this chapter, except for the sales price of
the home.

The sales price is deemed to be 100 percent of fair

market value instead of 90 percent of fair market value,

A

fixed initial age of 75 is used as it is close to the 76.7
median

age

of

FHA HECM borrowers

(HUD

1993,

p.

2-3).56

Specifically, the following assumptions are examined:

(1) the

discount rate (i.e., the assumed rate of return on assets),
(2) the move-out rate (as a percentage of mortality), (3) the
house sales price (as a percentage of market value), (4) the
average

house

appreciation

rate,

and

(5)

the

standard

deviation of the house appreciation rate (assuming the average
house appreciation rate is 4 percent per year).
The FHA break-even point is computed using the same
sample of 1000 subjects as is used for comparisons between
plans.

Variances

across

samples are not examined.

The

variance of a sample mean decreases in proportion to the

56The use of a lower age than the median age can be
considered conservative. The results of this research suggest
that the FHA earns a higher return from older borrowers than
younger borrowers.
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number in the sample.
thousand
percent

loans,

For instance,

the variance

for samples of one

of the mean

of the variance of an individual

return

is

return.57

0.1
For

items 1 to 4, the break-even point is computed to the nearest
reasonable interval (e.g., within one-tenth of a percent for
the home appreciation rate).

For item 5, NPV1s are computed

for rates of return varying from -4 percent to 8 percent.
Given these outcomes, the standard deviation producing a
zero NPV about a mean of 4 percent
normally distributed)
procedure.

(assuming returns are

is computed using a trial and error

The method of computing standard deviation of

returns is that used by Speare (1992) instead of that used by
Szymanoski (1990) in developing the FHA model.

The difference

is explained in chapter 2.

57The standard deviation of the sample's mean return is
about 3.2 percent of the standard deviation of an individual
return.
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CHAPTER IV
DATA ANALYSIS AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS
This chapter is divided into three parts.

The first part

summarizes the results of the simulation described in chapter
3.

It compares the four HEC plans from the prospective of the

homeowner, the financial institution, and the insurer (FHA)
under

different

assumptions.
simulations

age,

tax,

and

house

appreciation

rate

The second part examines the results of the
with

assumptions.

respect

to

consistency

with

tax

policy

The final part of the analysis examines the

sensitivity of some of the FHA model assumptions.
4.1

Plan Comparison
The main purpose of this study is to evaluate the need

for

the

FHA

to

insure

additional

forms

of

home

equity

conversion ("HEC"), namely a growth mortgage ("GR"), a split
interest

plan

("SI"), and a sale-leaseback

("SL").

The

assumption is made that a HEC plan will not be successful
unless it produces satisfactory results to the homeowner, the
financial institution,

and the FHA.

In general,

the net

present value of cash flow is used to measure the results, but
other measures are used as well.

In determining net present

value, it is assumed that each person or entity can invest
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surplus

funds

discount

rate

in

similar mortgages,

of 8*3

percent

thereby

annually

compounded monthly) before tax.

producing

(equivalent to

a
8%

For taxpayers subject to tax,

the discount rate is reduced by the tax on the interest
earned.

For example,

for an

individual

in the

15% tax

bracket, the discount rate is 7.055 percent (8.3 percent less
15% of 8.3%).
4.1.1

Homeowner
Unlike a financial institution or the FHA, the homeowner

is not in a position to form a portfolio of HEC instruments
that is likely to average the expected cash flow from the
instrument over time.

The homeowner has only one opportunity

to enter into a HEC plan.

Therefore, the homeowner's review

process is likely to be different from that of the financial
institution

or

the

FHA.

For

that

reason,

different

performance measures are used to evaluate the HEC plans for
the homeowner.
Among the

least sophisticated but possibly the most

important selection criterion

for many homeowners

initial annual payment to be received under each plan.

is the
Table

258 shows the initial payment received under each plan for
each age*

The initial payment for the SL is reduced by the

58For all tables, each of the plans is abbreviated as
follows (abbreviation in parentheses):
do nothing (NO) ?
standard HECM mortgage (FH); growth HECM mortgage (GR)? split
interest (SI); and sale-leaseback (SL).
Ill

interest

(including

FHA

insurance),

since

it

must

immediately repaid to the financial institution as rent.

be
Note

that up to age 75, the standard HECM mortgage ("FH") produces
the highest initial payment.

Somewhere between age 75 and 80,

the SI and SL produce higher initial payments, with the SI
being the higher.

Since the FH model contains a 4 percent

growth factor for the house

(which is not part of the SI

model), one would assume that the FH should produce a higher
initial payment.

However,

the FH model also includes an

assumption that all homeowners live to age 100, whereas the SI
and SL models use actual life expectancy (which is 8.69 years
at age 80) .

The differences

in assumed life expectancy

eventually lead SI and SL to have higher payments at about age
80.
A more sophisticated method of analyzing the results to
the homeowner is to examine the net present value ("NPV") of
expected cash flow59 based on the homeowner's age, tax rate,
and expected appreciation rate of the home.

In this study,

the expected cash flow is the expected cash flow of home
ownership.

Since home ownership is an expense, expected cash

flows are all negative.

Table 3 (with parts A, B, and C)

shows the homeowner's expected cash flow and its standard
deviation at each age, tax rate, and appreciation rate.

Since

59Unless clearly indicated otherwise the term "expected
cash flow" refers to the NPV of expected cash flow.
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some homeowners may choose not to borrow, an additional choice
of doing nothing ("NO") is added to the analysis.
Except where the appreciation rate is zero, NO results in
the

highest

expected

value.

Depending

on

the

home

appreciation rate, either the FH or the GR tends to have the
second highest expected value.

The FH has higher expected

values than the GR for home appreciation rates less than 4
percent and lower expected values for home appreciation rates
greater than 4 percent.

Although the FH's expected value is

slightly higher than the GR 1s where the home appreciation rate
equals

4

percent,

significant.

the

differences

are

generally

not

The SI consistently has the lowest expected

values at all ages, appreciation rates, and tax rates.

The SL

did better than expected; since the SI receives better tax
treatment than the SL, it was expected that the SL would have
the lowest expected cash flow.
As

indicated by the high standard deviations of the

expected cash flow, expected cash flow may be unimportant to
the homeowner.

Another way to analyze expected cash flow is

to use expected cash flow rank.
discussed in section 3.4.1.

The methodology used is

Table 4 (with parts A, B, and C)

shows the expected cash flow rank for each
tax

rate,

and house

appreciation

highest expected cash flow).

rate

HEC choice, age,
(1 represents

the

The use of ranks generally

results in the same ordering as the use of expected cash flow.
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The primary difference is that the SI generally has a higher
rank than the SL, although it has a lower expected cash flow.
The apparent reason for this is that the SL probably has a
greater skewness and may have had its expected cash flow
increased

by

a

few

events.

Likewise,

the

GR

in

some

situations has a higher expected rank than the FH, even though
the FH has a higher expected value.
Instead of using rank order comparisons, a homeowner may
wish to choose among the plans using probability of achieving
the highest expected cash flow (maxi-max type of analysis) or
the probability of not generating the lowest expected cash
flow (min-min type of analysis) .

Table 5 (with parts A, B,

and C) presents the maxi-max type of analysis and Table 6
(with parts A,
analysis.

B,

and C)

presents

the mini-min type

of

Since NO may not be a choice for some homeowners,

the tables also show whether a plan is among the highest or
lowest two expected values.
The results are generally consistent with the analysis of
ranks. NO is clearly the best choice for almost all homeowners
using maxi-max type of analysis.

The GR consistently (with a

few exceptions) gives the best mini-min results.

Although the

FH is more likely than the GR to have the highest expected
value, the GR is more likely to have one of the two highest
expected values.

This suggests that conservative homeowners

may prefer the GR, even if it is less likely to result in the
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highest expected value.
lowest probability

The SI and SL consistently have the

of having the highest

return and

the

highest probability of the lowest return (SI is worst for
those over 75 and SL is worst for those under 80).
4.1.1.1

Age Effect

As discussed in the previous section, the relative ranks
of the HEC plans are largely unaffected by the homeowner's
initial age.

Due to the lower variance of life expectancy and

reduced effects of compounding, differences in expected values
and ranks tend to converge with increases in age.

As in the

overall analysis, NO tends to have the highest expected rank
at all ages.

Of the

HEC plans, the GR

highest expected rankat all ages.

tends to have the

The SIand SL consistently

provide the two lowest NPVs of cash flows, with the SL being
the worst at lower ages and the SI being the worst at higher
ages.
2),

Contrast this with the size of initial payments (Table
indicating

thatcomparisons

of

initial

payments

may

mislead elderly homeowners.
Table 7 provides a convenient mechanism for displaying
these rank relationships*

It averages the ranks for each

initial age without regard to tax rate or home appreciation
rate*60

The

table

confirms

that NO

is

generally the

60A limitation of this methodology is that it assumes an
equal likelihood of each tax rate and home appreciation rate.
Similar limitations apply to Tables 8 and 9, discussed in the
next two sections.
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preferred choice at any age.

Of the HEC plans, the GR shows

the lowest expected rank at all ages,

except for age 65*

Although the FH shows a higher expected rank at age 65, the
difference

between

significant.

it

and

the

GR

is

not

statistically

The table shows that the expected ranks of NO or

using the FH tend to get worse as the initial age increases.
On the other hand, the expected ranks of the GR, the SI and
the SL tend to improve as the initial age increases.

Although

the SL tends to have a lower incidence of the worst returns at
higher ages than the SI, the SI has a superior expected rank
for all age groups (although the margin narrows as initial age
increases).
An examination of the times that NO had the highest or
lowest returns to the homeowner shows that NO consistently
(i.e., over 90 percent of the time) had either the highest or
lowest returns where home appreciation rates were at least 4
percent*

From this, it can be concluded that doing nothing

results in a higher expected cash flow unless the homeowner
greatly outlives the life expectancy.

The number of times (in

one thousand simulations) that doing nothing leads to the best
result can be interpreted as the percentage of homeowners of
the same age that the homeowner must out-live to increase NPV
(i.e.,

to

interesting

profit)

by using home

characteristic

of

equity

this

percentage decreases with initial age.
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conversion.

number

is

that

An
the

Assuming a zero tax

rate and 4 percent home appreciation, a 65 year old homeowner
must outlive 79*7 percent of homeowners of the same age to
profit by using home equity conversion, but a 85 year old
homeowner only needs to outlive 63.1 percent of homeowners of
the same age.
is

less

Where the home appreciation rate is zero, there

likelihood

that

NO

will

be

at

the

extremes

(particularly at younger ages) and the likelihood of having
the best result increases with initial age.

However, the

expected rank of NO (see Table 4A) tends to decrease as the
initial age increases.

These results suggest that initial age

is an important variable in determining the relative cost of
home equity conversion to the homeowner.
4.1.1.2

Tax Effect

The relative tax advantage of any plan can best be
examined by analyzing ranks (Table 4) and to a lesser extent
the likelihood of the highest (Table 5) and lowest (Table 6)
ranks.

Table 8 summarizes parts A, B, and C of Table 4 by

showing the expected rank of each plan without regard to
initial

age

or home

appreciation

rate.

A

plan

can

be

considered relatively favorably taxed if the plan consistently
improves its rank,

increases its likelihood of the highest

ranks and decreases its likelihood of the lowest ranks as
taxes are increased for a given age and appreciation rate.

On

the other hand, if the opposite is true, then the plan can be
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considered relatively unfavorably taxed in comparison with the
other choices.
NO not only tends to have the best outcomes for all ages
and for most appreciation rates, but the relative advantage of
NO (in relation to the other plans) consistently increases
with the homeowner's marginal tax rate.

This shows that none

of the HEC plans offer the homeowner an effective tax shelter.
Table 8 also shows that although the expected rank of each
HECM changes with tax rates, the order of the rankings between
instruments is not affected by the tax rate.

This clearly

shows that the tax effect is not significant to the homeowner.
Table 8 shows an unexpected outcome of this study.

While

the expected rank of SI is higher than that of SL for all tax
brackets,

the

difference

decreases

as the tax rate

between

their

increases.

respective
Since

the

ranks
SL has

particularly unfavorable tax consequences to the homeowner,
the differences would be expected to increase.
4.1.1.3

Home Appreciation Rate Effect

The home appreciation rate effect also can be seen from
the ranks of the alternative vehicles (Table 4) and from
likelihood of having the best

the

(Table 5) and worst results

(Table 6) . Table 9 summarizes parts A, B, and C of Table 4 by
providing the average rank of each vehicle for each home
appreciation rate without regard to the homeowner's initial
age or tax rate.
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From the tables it is evident that the SI and SL plans
display

their

appreciation,

best

relative

performance

the model assumption,

at

4

percent

and tend to get more

disadvantageous as appreciation deviates above or below this
rate.

If appreciation rates fall below 4 percent, mortgage

plans are at a relative advantage to the homeowner because the
mortgage plans assume a 4 percent growth while the homeowner
does not have a 4 percent increase in housing costs.
appreciation

rates

appreciation

goes

increase
to

above

the

4

financial

percent,

the

institution.

As
added
The

appreciation in the home value more than offsets the increase
in housing expenses (i.e., repairs, insurance, and taxes) paid
by the financial institution.
The

relative

advantage

appreciation rates increase.

of

NO

increases

as

home

Where the home appreciation rate

is less than 4 percent, the mortgage choices have a relative
advantage to the homeowner because mortgage annuity payments
are predicated on a 4 percent rate of appreciation.
appreciation rate increases,

As the

the mortgage balance is less

likely to exceed the mortgage balance (a major advantage of
the mortgage option) and is therefore less likely to produce
a windfall to the homeowner*
Table 9 shows that although the ranks of the five choices
vary with different appreciation rates, the order of the ranks
between choices remains the same.
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This suggests that the

homeowner's choice should be independent of the expected home
appreciation rate.

Of particular significance to the insurer,

the table shows that doing nothing tends to have the best
overall rank even assuming zero appreciation.

Table 10 gives

further evidence that this adverse selection problem is small.
Assuming zero appreciation, doing nothing is more likely to
yield a higher NPV than any HEC plan at any age or tax rate,
except that the FH is more likely to have a higher NPV at age
65 or 70 in the zero tax bracket and at age 65 in the 15
percent tax bracket*

The likelihood of any of the exceptions

does not exceed 60 percent.61
4.1.1.4

Summary

With few exceptions most homeowners expect to be better
off by NO than by using home equity conversion, suggesting
that a need for additional cash flow should be the most
important criterion for deciding whether to use home equity
conversion.

If home equity conversion is needed, the GR tends

to have the highest likelihood of producing a superior NPV,
except for certain persons at lower ages where the FH tends to
have the highest likelihood.

However, even for those persons,

the advantage tends to be small.

The superior NPV of the GR

must be tempered by its low initial payment, which may be too

61This indicates that the homeowner is unlikely to, use
home equity conversion as an investment device. It does not
address the possibility that homeowners who need home equity
conversion may be more likely to live in deteriorating
neighborhoods.
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low to benefit some homeowners.

Neither the SI nor the SL is

a favorable choice for the homeowner if NPV is used as a
criterion.
4.1.2

Financial Institution
Unlike the homeowner, the financial institution may (and

is expected to)

invest in a portfolio of HEC instruments.

This creates two major differences in the analysis of the
financial institution.
is

far

more

Secondly,
other,

First, the expected NPV of cash flow

significant

to

the

financial

institution.

rather than comparing the HEC vehicles to each

they can be analyzed individually.

That is, each

vehicle can be examined independently to find if its expected
NPV is such that an investment is prudent.
Table 11 (with parts A, B, and C) shows the expected NPV
of cash

flows

appreciation,

for each vehicle,
initial

age,

broken down by expected

and tax rate.

Note that,

as

expected, the mortgage options result in a NPV and standard
deviation of zero?

i.e.,

the mortgages produce a certain

return equal to the discount rate.

Both the SI and the SL

always result in a positive NPV to the financial institution*
However,

the standard deviation of the NPVs is very high,

indicating a need for a large portfolio to reduce risk.
high

standard

deviations

suggest

that

the

The

financial

institutions may be unwilling to make these vehicles more
attractive

to

the

homeowner.
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Even

if

the

financial

institutions were willing to do this, the expected NPVs to the
homeowner usually would still be worse than the mortgage plans
(i.e., the combined NPVs of the homeowner (Table 3) and the
financial institution (Table 11) are less favorable than the
mortgage plans).
Table 12 (with parts A, B, and C) shows the internal rate
of return

("IRR") of expected cash flows to the financial

institution of each plan.

This was developed by averaging the

cash flows for all one thousand subjects by year and computing
the IRR using the average cash flows.
are not considered meaningful.

IRRs over 100 percent

As expected, the two mortgage

plans have an IRR of 8.3 percent before tax and 5.478 (rounded
in the table) percent after tax, the same as the discount rate
used.
The IRRs of the SI and SL plans are extremely high,
especially at advanced initial ages.

Although the expected

NPV decreases with age, the IRR increases.

This is due, in

part, to the extremely high leverage used in the these two
plans.

At the initial age of 85, the income generated by the

death of the homeowners is sufficient to cover the expected
cash outflow from annuity payments and costs, even in the
first years of the plan.
Table 11 shows that taxes do not play a material role in
the financial institution's decision to invest in a particular
plan.

The NPVs of the mortgage plans are zero whatever the
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tax rate.

The SI and SL plans have higher after-tax NPV's for

ages 65 and 70, but lower after-tax NPV*s starting at age 75.
Table 12 adds additional evidence of this? post-tax IRRs are
consistently lower than pre-tax IRRs.
As with the other variables discussed above, the home
appreciation rate does not affect the financial institution's
return from the mortgage plans.
benefit

of

additional

Since the SI and SL give the

appreciation

to

the

financial

institution, the financial institution generally has a higher
expected NPV (Table 10) and IRR of expected NPV (Table 11) as
the appreciation rate of the home increases.

Due to lower

property taxes and insurance costs, zero appreciation yields
a better return than 4 percent appreciation at initial age 65.
For accounting policy, a major concern is whether adverse
accounting rules may discourage the use of the SI or SL.

The

adverse accounting rules are most pronounced for the SI, under
which the financial institution would report income only in
the year the house was sold or the year the homeowner died
(forfeiting the remaining annuity value).

The

financial

institution shows a loss for all other years.

Table 13 (with

parts A, B, and C) shows the NPV of accounting flows of each
plan.

As demonstrated by the table, the expected NPVs for all

plans are positive.

The expected NPVs of the SI and SL always

exceed that of the GR and, except for ages below 75 or at a
zero home appreciation rate, exceed that of the FH.
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Clearly,

given a portfolio of investments, the adverse effects are
largely averaged away.
indicates that the

In fact,

a year-by-year analysis

expected, accounting

income tendstobe

positive for all but a few years, even at initial age 65.
4.1.3

The FHA
Table 14 shows

the NPV of the FHA expected cash flows

from insuring each of the four plans. The minimum return on
investment (IRR) needed for the FHA to break-even (Table 15)
provides

some additional

information.

Since the

insured

amount under the SI is the same as the FH, the values for the
two plans are the same.

At 8 percent appreciation, the FHA

has positive expected cash flow for each year under all plans.
Since negative returns are unlikely,

for convenience,

the

table reports the minimum return as zero.
Assuming a house appreciation rate of 4 percent, Table 15
shows that the FHA should break-even under its current plan?
expected cash flow is significantly different from zero only
at age 80.

At that appreciation rate, the IRR needed to

break-even varies from 7.28 to 8.60 percent.

At that rate,

the break-even rate for the GR is lower, ranging from 4.17 to
5.29 percent.
organized.

This lower rate is due to the way the GR is
The balance due on the GR is lower than the

mortgage balance on the FH until age 100.

The higher NPVs of

the GR for growth rates of zero and 4 percent are consistent
with IRRs.

At an 8 percent home appreciation rate, the FH has
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a higher NPV than the GR, because more premiums are collected
and no claims are paid.
An examination of the SL suggests that the plan presented
is adverse to the FHA.

At a zero home appreciation rate, the

FHA's NPV of expected losses is more than triple that of any
other plan.

At 4 percent appreciation, rather than breaking-

even, the plan shows a significant profit for an initial age
of 65, while showing significant losses for initial ages of 75
and over.
than

Although the NPV of expected cash flows is higher

any other plan

percent,

if the home appreciation rate

is 8

it is probably not enough to offset the negative

results at lower appreciation rates.
4.2

Tax Policy Questions
This section addresses two important issues.

is

the

concept

of

vertical

taxpayers pay more taxes)*

equity

(i.e.,

The first

higher

income

The second is the existence of a

tax subsidy (i.e., it is more profitable to pay taxes than not
pay taxes).

The discussion in Section 4.1 foreshadows the

examination of to these two issues.

Since tax is not a

significant factor for either the homeowner or the financial
institution, there is not likely to be a problem with either
issue.
Section 4.1.1.2, noted that the ranking of plans to the
homeowner is not affected by tax rates.

A study of Table 3

suggests that the choice between plans using NPV is also not
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affected by tax rates, except in a few instances where the
differences between the NPV's of the two plans are small.

All

these instances involved a choice between the FH and the GR,
which are not actually different from a tax standpoint.

In

Table 11, the ranking of N P V s of each plan for any given age
and home appreciation rate is the same before- and after-tax.
This shows that the tax system does not favor one plan over
another*
The second question is closely related to the findings in
Section 4.1.1.2.

The results show that most homeowners would

be better off doing nothing than using any form of HEC.
second question raises a different issue:

The

Is there a negative

effective tax rate on expected cash flows for any plan?

To

evaluate this, the NPV of expected cash flows was examined for
both the homeowner and financial institution at all possible
tax rates (0, 15 and 28 percent for the homeowner and 0 and 34
percent for the financial institution).

A discount rate of

8.3 percent was used regardless of tax rate.

The expected

NPV of cash flows for a higher tax rate is always lower than
that for a lower tax rate (given the same initial age and home
appreciation rate).

Therefore, the hypothesis that there is

a tax subsidy cannot be supported.
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4 *3

Sensitivity of the FHA Model
The simulation used to test the sensitivity of the FHA

model resulted in a base expected net present value of $1,200
with a standard deviation of $5,077.

Considering the number

of simulations (1,000), the standard deviation of the sample
mean

is $161.

The confidence

intervals

for testing the

equality of the means in subsequent tests are $316 at the 95
percent confidence level and $415 at the 99 percent confidence
level.62

The tests each have 1,000

data points and assume

a two tailed test.
The

base

analysis

shows

that

the

minimum

discount rate to break-even is 5.79 percent.

expected

The expected

values are not significantly different from zero (p = .05) for
interest rates ranging from about 5.4 percent to 6.3 percent
(see Table

16) .

The differences

increasing

discount

rates

(in

in expected value with

Table

16)

show

that

the

differences decrease as interest rates increase.
The move-out rate does not appear to be a significant
factor for the FHA.

As shown by Table 17, assuming no move-

outs, the FHA would expect a net present value of cash flows
of $728, which is significantly different from zero (p = .01).

62These confidence intervals are used for all tests of
the FHA assumptions. In computing changes in the mean value
of expected return with changes in the values of the
assumptions, changes in the standard deviation of the returns
were not computed. It is possible that confidence levels for
different changes in assumptions may differ from these levels.
However, the changes are likely to be small.
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The table also shows that a five percentage point change in
the move-out rate seldom made a difference exceeding $100.
This suggests that differences in expected move-out rates of
15 percent

cannot be

said to be statistically different

(p = .05) .
As demonstrated by Table 18, the effect of the sales
price as a percent of fair market value by itself is not an
important

variable.

The

net

present

value

is

not

significantly different from zero (p = .05) if the sales price
discount is between 10 and 14 percent.63

Discounts greater

than 14 percent are probably unusual.
The expected home appreciation rate is a major component
of the FHA model.

As demonstrated by Table 19, FHA's risk of

overestimating the home appreciation rate is great.
rate64 for breaking even is 3.3 percent.

The mean

Rates of 3.2 to

3.4 percent are not statistically different (p = .05) from
zero, a narrow range.

The table also shows that most of the

profits resulting from appreciation rates higher than assumed
by the model primarily benefit the homeowner.. For example,
appreciation in excess 7 percent only benefits the homeowner.
This relationship demonstrates the importance of the
variance of the mean appreciation rate between homes.

Table

63The methodology of this research considers the discount
a fixed variable, no analysis is performed as to the effect of
variance*
64This assumes all homes appreciate at the same rate.
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20 shows that if the mean home appreciation rate is 4 percent,
the expected net present value would be approximately zero if
the

standard

percent.

deviation

of

returns

between

homes

is

2.8

A standard deviation of between 2.2 percent and 3.4

percent is not statistically different (p = .05) from zero.
Assuming a mean 4 percent appreciation rate and using the 2.2
standard deviation, the FHA could expect to break even if
about

two-thirds

of the homes have

an appreciation

rate

between 1.8 percent and 6.2 percent and less than one-sixth of
the homes have an appreciation rate of less than 1.2 percent.
It appears that the range is reasonable.
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TABLE 2
HOMEOWNER'S INITIAL ANNUAL PAYMENT
(in dollars)

130

TABLE 3A
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HOMEOWNER'S NPV OF EXPECTED CASH FLOW
ZERO APPRECIATION
(in dollars)

#

Lowest expected N PV (p

—

.05)
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TABLE 3B
HOMEOWNER'S NPV OF EXPECTED CASH FLOW
4% APPRECIATION

(in dollars)

INITIAL AGE
65

70

-8 1,929*
(3 2 ,522)
z
t:
R
0
I
A
X

FH

GR
51

SL

NO
i
5
P
R
C
L
N
T
T
H
X

FH

GR

SI

SL

NO
8
P
c
R
r
E
N
T
I
A

f
H
ViR

Si

V

SL

(31,190)

80

85

-66,370*

-4 3,738*

-4 3,738*

(29,166)

(26 ,2 7 2 )

(2 2 ,871)

-95,317

-83,326

-70,546

-58,193

-45,933

(3 0 ,058)

(28,799)

(26,810)

(2 3,920)

(16 ,2 2 6 )

-97,638

-84,992

-71,945

-59,159

-47,912

(3 2,550)

(31,046)

(28,716}

(25 ,4 1 4 )

(2 1 .121)

-115,652

-105,404*

-93 ,3 18 *

-78,973*

-65,920*

(6,23 0 )

(4 ,686)

(5 ,51 0 )

(1 1,590)

(2 0,219)

-115,300

-104,137

-91,274

-76,425

-6 3,134

(1 5 ,605)

(15,694)

(16,639)

(2 0,122)

(2 6 ,714)

-86,788*

--74,221

-61.811*

(3 2 ,881)

(3 0,732)

(2 8 .123)

( 2 4 , 8u4j

(21 ,2 0 0 )

-95,625

-82,258

-68,907

-56,200

-45,200

(3 2,665)

(3 0,568)

(2 7,749)

(24,178)

(19 ,7 2 7 )

-97,204

-83,519

-69,880

-■56,899

-45,736

(3 5 ,232)

(3 2 ,806)

(2 9,588)

(2 5,573)

(2 0 ,738)

--122,666

-111,547*

-98,328*

-8 2 ,4 4 1 1

-67,946*

(9 ,93 5 )

(7,16 6 )

(3 ,42 7 )

(5 ,13 2 )

(14 ,4 8 2 )

-122,183

-108.797

-93,9124

-77,413

-62,860

(20,164)

(1 8,939)

(1 7,816)

(1 8,124)

(2 2,240)

-8 1,929*

-69 ,2 45 *

-57,123

-45,960

-42,491*

(32,711)

(29,913)

(2 3,116)

(20 ,9 9 4 )

-95,877

-81,302

-67,245

-54,248

-43,285

(36,508)

(32,394)

(28,652)

(2 4,374)

(19 ,4 0 6 )

-96,637

-81,954

-66,768

-54,658

-93,632
(20 ,3 3 1 )

*

-40,219*

(3 8,083)

(34,580)

(3 0 ,402)

(2 5,699)

-1 3 1 .5 2 7 '

-1 18,746*

-104,082*

-86 ,4 18 *

-70,365*

(2 1 ,118)

(17,383)

.... AXhm i ... .

(7 ,3 3 3 )

(9 ,89 6 )

-129,465

-113,764

-96,352

-/is, 745

-62,998

(2 5 ,901)

(2 3,799)

L . ( . ? 1 ’0 6 6 ) _

( 1 8 ,4 0 8 )

ytandarc; deviation is in parentheses.

*
*

75

Highest expected NPV (p = . 05 )
Lowest expected NPV (p = .05)
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j

(19 ,2 3 5 )

TABLE 3C
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#
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TABLE 4A
HOMEOWNER'S NPV OF EXPECTED CASH FLOW RANK
ZERO APPRECIATION
INITIAL AGE

Differences between ranks of more than .10 and .15 are significant at the
and the .01 levels of significance respectively.
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.05

TABLE 4B
HOMEOWNER1S NPV OF EXPECTED CASH FLOW RANK
4% APPRECIATION

Differences between ranks of more than .10 and .15 are significant at the
and the .01 levels of significance respectively.

135

.05

TABLE 4C
HOMEOWNER1S NPV OF EXPECTED CASH FLOW RANK
8% APPRECIATION

Differences between ranks of more than .10 and .15 are significant at the
and the .01 levels of significance respectively.

136

.05

TABLE 5A
TIMES PLAN HAD HIGHEST TWO NPVs TO HOMEOWNER
ZERO APPRECIATION

*
**
***
1
##

Probability
Probability
Probability
Probability
Probability

of
of
of
of
of

highest
highest
highest
highest
highest

(or
(or
(or
(or
(or

highest
highest
highest
highest
highest
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2)
2)
2)
2)
2)

NPV(s)
NPV(s)
NPV(s)
NPV(a)
NPV(s)

>
>
>
<
<

50%
75%
90%
10%
5%

(P
(P
(P
(P
(P

-.05)
-.05)
-.05)
-.05)
-.05)

TABLE 5B
TIMES PLAN HAD HIGHEST TWO NPVs TO HOMEOWNER
4% APPRECIATION

*
**
***
•
##

Probability
Probability
Probability
Probability
Probability

of
of
of
of
of

highest
highest
highest
highest
highest

(or
(or
(or
(or
(or

highest
highest
highest
highest
highest
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2)
2)
2)
2)
2)

NPV(s)
NPV(s)
NPV(s)
NPV(s)
NPV(s)

>
>
>
<
<

50%
75%
90%
10%
5%

(p
(p
(p
(p
(p

-.05).
-.05).
-.05).
-.05).
-.05).

TABLE

5C

TIMES PLAN HAD HIGHEST TWO NPVs TO HOMEOWNER
8% APPRECIATION

Probability
Probability
Probability
Probability
Probability

of
of
of
of
of

highest.
highest
highest
highest
highest

(or
V
(or
(or
(or

highest
highest
highest
highest
highest

139

2)
2)
2)
2)
2)

NPV(3)
NPV{3)
NPV{3)
NPV(s)
NPV(s)

>
>
>
<
<

50%
75%
90%
10%
5%

(P
(P
(P
(P
(P

-.05)
-.05)
-.05)
-.05)
-.05)

TABLE

6A

X>*3

TIMES PLAN HAD LOWEST TWO NPVs TO HOMEOWNER
ZERO APPRECIATION

*
**
***

*
##

Probability
Probability
Probability
Probability
Probability

of
of
of
of
of

lowest
lowest
lowest
lowest
lowest

(or
(or
(or
(or
(or

lowest
lowest
lowest
lowest
lowest
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2)
2)
2)
2)
2)

HPV(s)
NPV(s)
NPV(a)
NPV(s)
NPV(s)

>
>
>
<
<

50%
75%
90%
10%
5%

(p
(p
(p
(p
(p

-.05).
-.05).
-.05).
«.05).
-.05).

TABLE

6B

H! ^32W OS3E
»
3

Oi»
*
-

8

X>

TIMES PLAN HAD LOWEST TWO NPVs TO HOMEOWNER
4% APPRECIATION

*
**
***

*
##

Probability
Probability
Probability
Probability
Probability

of
of
of
of
of

lowest for
lowest (or
lowest (or
lowest (or
lowest (or

lowest
lowest
lowest
lowest
lowest
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2)
2)
2)
2)
2)

NPV(s)
NPV(s)
NPV(s)
NPV(s)
NPV(s)

>
>
>
<
<

50%
75%
90%
10%
5%

(p
(p
(p
(p
(p

-.05).
*.05).
-.05).
-.05).
-.05).

TABLE

6C

X>i-3

TIMES PLAN HAD LOWEST TWO NPVs TO HOMEOWNER
8% APPRECIATION

*
**
***
§

##

Probability
Probability
Probability
Probability
Probability

of
of
of
of
of

lowest
lowest
lowest
lowest
lowest

(or
(or
(or
(or
{or

lowest
lowest
lowest
lowest
lowest

2)
2)
2)
2)
2)
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NPV(s)
NPV(s)
NPV(s)
NPV(s)
NPV(s)

>
>
>
<
<

50%
75%
90%
10%
5%

(P “ -05)

(P
(P
(P
(P

“‘05)
--05)
-.05)
--05)

TABLE 7
HOMEOWNER'S EXPECTED RANK BY AGE
(without regard to tax or home appreciation rates)

Differences of .05 are significant at p =.05.
Differences of .09 are significant at p =.01.

TABLE 8
HOMEOWNER'S EXPECTED RANK BY TAX RATE
(without regard to initial age or home appreciation rate)
TAX RATE

1

ZERO

15
PERCENT

28
PERCENT

NO

1.90

1, 61

1.. 44

FH

2.81

2 .7 6

2 .67

GR

2 .26

2 .3 0

2.28

SI

3.73

4.08

4 *22

4.25

4 .39

SL

I

4.30

|

!
i

j
“I

Differences of .05 are significant at p =.05.
Differences of .06 are significant at p =.01.
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TABLE 9
HOMEOWNER1S EXPECTED RANK BY HOME APPRECIATION RATE
(without regard to initial age or tax rate)

Differences of .05 are significant at p =.05.
Differences of .06 are significant at p =.01.
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TABLE 10
TIMES HOMEOWNER1S NPV EXCEEDS DOING NOTHING
ZERO APPRECIATION
INITIAL AGE
'
.

75

80

85

4 18

371

376

FH

583*

5 21 *

GR

420

400

34 3

371

376

16

142

3 09

371

37 6

SL

16

93

271

371

376

FH

5 32 *

463

4 06

36 0

32 0

GP

37 0

343

293

276

321

SI

10

41

160

27 6

321

SL

10

24

91

324

321

FH

496

426

364

311

26 9

GR

54 5

3 08

2 76

224

230

SI

8

20

65

193

26 9

SL

8

17

34

120

SI

X

> HI

*"3 25

m a

00 *0

■

x

> »-3

*-3 25 S3 o Jtf

fcd ha

in h*

■

x

>

*~3

O

5d Id n i

;SVV ?r;xli-SLfi;-I333

*
**
***

|

230

Probability that plan's N PV is greater than doing nothing > 50% (p =.05).
Probability that plan's N PV is greater than doing nothing > 75% (p =.05)
Probability that plan's N P V is greater than doing nothing > 90% (p =.05).

145

TABLE 11A
FINANCIAL INSTITUTION'S NPV OF EXPECTED CASH FLOW
ZERO APPRECIATION
(in dollars)
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TABLE 11B
FINANCIAL INSTITUTION'S EXPECTED CASH FLOW
4% APPRECIATION
(in dollars)

NM«0
J
H rtjX
■ <*>
0*M K o m
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TABLE 11C
FINANCIAL INSTITUTION'S NPV OF EXPECTED CASH FLOW
8% APPRECIATION
(in dollars)
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TABLE 11C
FINANCIAL INSTITUTION'S NPV OF EXPECTED CASH FLOW
8% APPRECIATION
(in dollars)
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TABLE 12A
FINANCIAL INSTITUTION'S IRR OF EXPECTED CASH FLOW
ZERO APPRECIATION
(in percent)
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TABLE 12B

*-3

H2Mn»W*3

a* w

1

X > i-3

O » M

FINANCIAL INSTITUTION'S IRR OF EXPECTED CASH FLOW
4% APPRECIATION
(in percent)
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TABLE 12C
FINANCIAL INSTITUTION'S IRR OF EXPECTED CASH FLOW
8% APPRECIATION
(in percent)
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TABLE 13A
FINANCIAL INSTITUTION'S NPV OF ACCOUNTING INCOME
ZERO APPRECIATION
(in dollars)
INITIAL AGE

75

80

32,498

27,114

21,618

16,337

_______
12,249

(23,213)

(21,868)

(20,055)

(17,771)

(1.5,712)

9,83 0

8,073

6,497

5,142

4.157

(5,830)

(5,200)

(4,627)

(4,116)

(3,758)

22,021

20,372

18,220

14,270

11,297

(21,166)

(24,097)

(28,128)

(33,965)

(40,465)

30,184

31,242

26,882

23,295

(25,343)

(27,745)

(31,640)

(37,6.14)

(44,426)

32,356

25,444

19,218

13,833

9,959

(27,186)

(23,692)

(20,254)

(16,811)

(14,104 )

9,320

7, 173

5,471

4,131

3,21.7

(6,958)

(5,419)

(4,471)

(3,708)

(3,197)

26,887

22,710

18,496

13,4.23

9,816

(19,156)

(19,500)

(20,703)

(23,633)

(27,678)

30,565

27,465

22,502

18,273

(18,573)

(21,273)

(25,463)

(30,326)

FH

tfi

70

CO

j

65

GR

SI

SL

FH

GR

;

si

j
1
SL
j
_______

i 32,457
1
j (18,864)

All NPVs are significantly different from zero (p = .01)
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j

TABLE 13B
FINANCIAL INSTITUTION'S NPV OF ACCOUNTING INCOME
4% APPRECIATION
(in dollars)
=s===ss===s==========n

" -

r

,

F " * 8®a“

_
- INITIAL AGE
75

65

70

32,498

27,114

21,618

(23,213)

(21,868)

9, 880

80

!

85

j

16.337

12,249

(20,055)

(17,771)

(15,712)

|
I

8,073

6,497

5,142

4,157

|

(5,830)

(5,200)

(4,6e /)

(4,116)

(3,758)

|

19,822

21,601

21,927

19,426

16,742

(25,021)

(27,133)

(30,510)

(35,655)

(41,383)

19,881

23,530

25,171

23,261

21f059

(29,934)

(31,542)

(34,686)

(40,019)

(46,233)

32,356

25,444

19,218

13,833

9,959

(27,186)

(23,692)

(20,254)

(16,811)

(14,104 )

9,320

7, 173

5,471

4, 131

3,217

(6,598)

(5,419)

(4,471)

(3/708)

(3,197)

24,248

23,321

21,257

17,304

13,840

(16,755)

(18,231)

(20,517)

(24,048)

(27,995)

22,546

23,512

n "• to7f

19,531

16,477

(27,411)

(31,799)

FH
E
R
0

GR

T

SI

A

X
SL
3
4

FH

P

!
I

E
R

GR

c

E
tl
T

SI

T

A

A. ,i~ / «

SL

(23,689)
(21,572)
_ ____ (20,656)
Standard'"' Jeviation is xn parentheses7

All NPVs are significantly different from zero (p = .01).
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TABLE 13C

X > HI

H Z M O » H !d

**

u.s

a

X iP Hi

O WWM

FINANCIAL INSTITUTION'S NPV OF ACCOUNTING INCOME
8% APPRECIATION
(in dollars)
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TABLE 14

pi s
a>

mo

FHA'S NPV OF EXPECTED CASH FLOW
(in dollars)

Significantly different from zero
Significantly different from zero
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(p = .05 one tail)
(p = .01 one tail)

TABLE 15

M HJ > id

3 O M H > M Ci M 50 US hJ >

FHA BREAK-EVEN RETURN ON INVESTMENTS
(in percent)
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TABLE 16
EFFECT OF DISCOUNT RATE ON FHA'S EXPECTED NPV
(in dollars)
DISCOUNT RATE

EXPECTED NPV

0 .0 %

-9,215

0.5%

-7,729

1 .0 %

-6,436

1.5%

-5,311

2 .0 %

-4,329

2.5%

-3,474

3.0%

-2,728

3.5%

-2,076

4.0%

-1,508

4.5%

-

1,011

5.0%

-576

5.5%

-197

5.8%

8

6 .0 %

135

6.5%

426

7.0%

680

7.5%

902

8.0%

1,096

8.3%

1,200

8.5%

1,265

9.0%

1,413

9.5%

1,542

1 0 .0%

1, 655
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TABLE 17
EFFECT OF MOVE-OUT RATE ON FHA'S EXPECTED NPV
MOVE-OUT RATE
.(percent of mortality)

EXPECTED NPV
(in dollars)

0

728

5

759

10

911

15

968

20

1,009

25

1,104

30

1,200

35

1,298

40

1,443

45

1,556

50

1,631

55

1,701

60

1,784

65

1,885

70

1,985

75

2,103

80

2,216

85

2,332

90

2 ,403

95

2,472

100

2,529
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TABLE 18
EFFECT OF SALES PRICE DISCOUNT ON FHA'S EXPECTED NPV
DISCOUNT
(percent of FMV1

EXPECTED NPV
fin dollars)

0

1,200

1

1,115

2

1,030

3

944

4

859

5

774

6
7

678

8

464

9

157

10

250

11

142

12

35

18

-88

14

-216

15

-345

16

-473

17

-602

18

-730

19

-864

20

-1,029

571
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TABLE 19
EFFECT OF HOME APPRECIATION RATE ON FHA'S EXPECTED NPV
(in dollars)
APPRECIATION RATE

EXPECTED NPV

-4.0%

-12,537

-3.5%

-11,779

-3.0%

-11,089

-2.5%

-10,353

-2.0%

-9,562

-1.5%

-8,749

-1.0%

-7,926

-0.5%

-7,039

0.0%

-6,156

0.5%

-5,243

1.0%

-4,307

1.5%

-3,371

2.0%

-2,419

2.5%

-1,441

3.0%

-520

3.3%

16

3.5%

193

4.0%

1,200

4.5%

1,926

5.0%

2,527

5.5%

2,955

6.0%

3,232

6.5%

3,365

7.0%

3,401

7.5%

3,405

8.0%

3,405
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TABLE 20
EFFECT OF APPRECIATION'S STANDARD DEVIATION ON FHA'S
EXPECTED NPV
(in dollars)
STANDARD DEVIATION

EXPECTED NPV

0.0%

1,200

0.5%

1,146

1.0%

1,001

1.5%

775

2.0%

500

2.5%

199

2.8%

13

3.0%

-112

3.5%

-425

4.0%

-735

4.5%

-1,038

5.0%

-1,330

5.5%

-1,609

6.0%

-1,873

6.5%

-2,121

7.0%

-2,353

7.5%

-2,569

8.0%

-2,771

8.5%

-2,958

9.0%

-3,132

9.5%

-3,294

10.0%

-3,444
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
This chapter is divided in three parts:
the research,
limitations

(2)

of

(1) a summary of

public policy recommendations,

the

model,

suggesting

areas

of

and

(3)

further

research.
5 *1

Summary
As expected, this research demonstrates that none of the

plans are Pareto optimal.
the

highest

homeowners.

and

the

For example, each of the plans had

lowest

study

present

value

for

some

This suggests that none of the plans should be

prohibited or discouraged.
the

net

The most significant finding of

is that neither the SI or SL is an effective

economic substitute for the FHA HECM.

Although the SI and SL

are profitable for financial, institutions, their profits are
more than offset by additional costs to the homeowner and, in
the case of the SL, the FHA.

Financial institutions may be

reluctant to pass on any excess cash flow to the homeowner due
to the high variance of expected returns.

Although these two

plans have features that may make them more desirable to the
homeowner then the HECM,

they consistently have a higher

expected cost (as measured by NPV) than the HECM.
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5.1.1

Homeowners
The

effects

appreciation

of

rate,

the

homeowner's

and

unexpectedly small*

tax

rate

age,

on

expected

plan

home

choice

are

In general, most homeowners can expect to

be better off not using a HEC plan than using one.

If the

homeowner requires a HEC plan, a mortgage plan provides the
highest

expected

NPV

and

the

growth

mortgage

generally

provides the highest expected NPV.
5.1*2

Adverse Selection
The research suggests that the FHA need not be concerned

that homeowners will use the HECM if they expect their homes
not to increase in value.

Most homeowners would be better off

not using a HEC plan, even if they assumed that the property
would not appreciate at all.

Homeowners at age 65 or 70 who

pay no tax or at age 65 in the 15 percent tax bracket have a
slightly better than 50 percent chance of being better off by
using the standard HECM.
speculative

and

for

significant problem.

too

However,
narrow

the benefits

a

group

to

are too

present

a

It is likely that homeowners in lower

tax brackets would be less likely to speculate than those in
higher tax brackets.

Although this addresses the adverse

selection risk of homeowner speculation, it does not address
Speare's (1992) concern that those homeowners that need home
equity

conversion

are

the

ones
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most

likely

to

live

in

neighborhoods with home appreciation rates below the national
average.
5.1.3

Tax

Policy

From the standpoint of tax policy, the results show that
any tax effect

is not significant enough to

influence a

decision either by the homeowner or a financial institution.
There is less incentive for a homeowner to enter a HEC plan as
tax

rates

increase,

indicating

consistent with vertical equity.

that

the

HEC

plans

are

In addition, the specific

tests for vertical integration and tax subsidy indicate there
is no violation of these tax policy principles.
5.1*4

Accounting Policy
At first glance, the accounting treatment of the SI and

the SL under current rules do not appear to fully reflect the
economics of their respective transactions.

This suggests

that financial institutions may be reluctant to enter into
these arrangements, particularly if they were concerned with
maintaining

regulatory

income and capital.

However,

the

results of this research show that given a large portfolio of
investments, the accounting flows from the portfolio should be
large enough not to discourage the investments in the plans.
The NPV of expected accounting income of the SI and the SL is
consistently higher than the NPV of expected cash flow.

This

indicates that accounting flows generally precede cash flow.
5.1.5

FHA Assumptions
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Although many of the FHA assumptions appear generous,
they do not appear to be more generous than the assumptions
used in other HEC plans.

The liberal assumptions are in part

driven by the FHA policy not to profit by its plan.

This

policy permits the FHA little leeway for errors in their
assumptions.

This research shows that FHA met its goal by

being marginally profitable, excluding administrative costs,
based on its assumptions.

The simulations indicate that it is

not likely that a violation of any assumption tested will by
itself cause a loss.

However, a change in the appreciation

rate to below 3.3 percent or the standard deviation of the
appreciation rate (assuming a 4 percent average rate) to more
than 2.8 percent would result in a loss.
assumes

that

the

FHA

could

fund

their

This research
premiums

investments with the same return as the mortgages.

with
If the

returns are significantly (about 2.5 percentage points) below
that

of the mortgages,

then the FHA will

incur a

loss.

Homeowner move-out rates do not have a significant effect on
the model.

Even if the move-out rate is zero, the FHA still

has a margin of profit.
rate

suggests

that the

repayment upon move-out.

The low significance of the move-out
FHA need

not

stringently

enforce

In fact, it may consider loosening

it rules to permit the loan to remain in effect after moveout*

This will allow the homeowner to use rents from the

house to provide additional income for long term care.
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5-2

Recommendations

5-2.1.

FHA Recommendations

The

results

show that neither the

SI or the SL is

expected to result in a NPV to the homeowner that is as
favorable

as

a mortgage

plan.

unprofitable for the FHA.
not insure the SL plan.

In

addition,

the

SL

is

This suggests that the FHA should

Insuring the SI plan under the terms

of this research would impose no additional cost to the FHA
(since the insurance is based on the standard HECM mortgage).
However, the need for the insurance can be questioned.

The

plan is not particularly beneficial to the homeowner and it is
unclear whether financial institutions would be interested in
this form of insurance.
The FHA should institute a growth mortgage option.

This

would provide inflation protection to the homeowner and is
profitable for the FHA.

The growth option could be changed to

a cost of living option.
of higher

inflation,

Although the FHA will bear the risk

this

should be more than offset by

reduced home appreciation rate risk.

Over time, homes tend to

appreciate with inflation.
5.2*2

Public Assistance Recommendations
Even though the SI and SL plans are not sufficiently

beneficial

to

the

homeowner

to

encourage

financial

institutions to offer them, uninsured plans should not be
discouraged.

For example,

Congress or the Social Security
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Administration should consider establishing rules that allow
elderly homeowners

to convert their home

equity

annuity without affecting their SSI payments.

into

an

There appears

to be no policy reason for allowing HECM mortgage payments to
be exempt from the income rules while annuity payments are
not.

This is clearly a question of "form over substance."

An

exemption for home equity conversion should also produce more
liquidity in the housing market since the elderly would not be
forced

to

stay

in their home

in order

to

continue

SSI

benefits.
5.2.3

Tax Recommendations
Both the SI and SL have unneeded tax clouds over their

heads.

These are clouds that the Treasury Department has

indicated a willingness to change.

Consistent with this

Treasury Department policy, Congress should amend section 125
to allow the $125,000 exemption for the sale of a remainder
interest to an unrelated party.

The transaction would be

treated as the sale of the entire property followed by a buy
back of the life estate.

In addition, a sale-leaseback of a

residence to an unrelated party should be recognized as such,
regardless of the term of the lease.
5.3

Limitations
The limitations of this research are a result of the

assumptions used in the model and the FHA model.

Further

research is needed to test the appropriateness of the model
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assumptions.

For -example,

both

the

FHA model

and

this

research assume that life expectancy can be estimated by the
HEW life expectancy tables.

Almost all commentators have been

critical of this assumption.

In addition, FHA does not use

joint life tables for joint owners.

Joint owners were not

included in this study because the effect of a joint owner's
death on the move-out and mortality of the other joint owner
is not known.

Further research is necessary on the actual

life expectancy of homeowners using home equity conversion as
well as the effect of the death of one owner on the mortality
and move-out rate of the survivor.

The HECM program may be

unprofitable if the FHA mortality assumptions are too liberal,
particularly if the average initial age of the borrowers
should

decrease.

This

research

suggests

that the

FHA's

expected profit from a HECM mortgage is lower for younger
borrowers.
Virtually all current FHA HECM mortgages have a variable
interest rate.

To avoid confounding, this research does not

explore the effect of variable rates on the homeowner or the
FHA.

There is a need for further research in this area.

For

example, does the FHA's method of computing annuity payments
for variable mortgages result in a subsidy to the homeowner?
This study only analyzed the sensitivity of the tenure
mortgage

to

the

FHA

assumptions.
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Further

research

is

necessary to explore the sensitivity of the line of credit and
term mortgages to the assumptions.
The

SI

and

SL plans

protect

the

homeowner

against

unforseen expenses (e.g., a new roof) . This is a risk that is
not measured by the methodology of this research*

Further

research is necessary to find if the problem is significant
and if so develop methods to protect homeowners using the
HECM.

For example,

some other HECM products require the

homeowner to leave a reserve for repairs.
This

research model

assumes that the homeowner will

continue

the mortgage until

death

or move-out*

Further

research

is needed to develop costs and benefits to the

homeowner, the financial institution, and the FHA for either
refinancing at lower interest rates or refinancing if the
property appreciates more than expected in the FHA model.
Financial institutions may elect to "put" the mortgage to
the FHA when the mortgage equals 98 percent of the maximum
claim amount.

This study assumes that the interest rate

remains constant and that the financial institution will elect
o

(3onI
*.

nu

d

37

^5•

fu r

17 r^2s*

37

jsi

necessary as to the interest rate exposure of the FHA relating
to this put.
The simulation of the SI and SL assumed that homeowners
would not use the plan as a device for selling their homes.
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If either of these plans are developed, specific provisions
would have to be included to avoid this problem*
Finally, the test of the FHA model examined a single
parameter

at

determine

the

a time.
joint

Further
risk

of

parameter.
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research
changes

in

is necessary
more

than

to
one
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